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Japan has significant capabilities to protect its
sealanes out to 1000 nautical miles to the south of its
main ports. By concentrating military expenditures on
forces to improve air defense, strait control, and
convoy operations, Japan could have a credible defense,
even in the worst possibility: global war and a Soviet
attack.
The Japanese should concentrate on improving the
air defense of Japan and the ocean between Iwo Jima and
Okinawa, increasing their stockpile of mines and their
mine warfare forces, and increasing the numbers of
their long-range maritime patrol aircraft and surface
escort ships. These improvements all maintain the
defensive nature of Japanese forces and are attainable
within the next decade
.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. IMPORTANCE OF SEA LANES TO JAPAN
Japan is the only major power whose weakness is its
lack of resources and vulnerability to interuptions of
its trade. Sea lane defense is critical to its
survival in time of war: No country exports and imports
a larger volume of materials by sea than Japan. i In
1984, over 85 percent of Japan's $147 billion worth of
exports, went by sea, as well as almost 90 percent of
its $112.7 billion imports. The majority of this trade
is with North America, Asia and the Middle East.
2
Nothing shows the importance of sea lanes to Japan
more graphically than an analysis of its attempts to
reduce its dependence oil imports. Japan imports all
of its oil, most of it from the Middle East. (Table I
lists Japanese oil imports and their source.
)
Ever since the 1973-74 oil crisis, Japan has been
trying to reduce its dependence on imported oil by
diversifying and gaining influence over its sources,
developing alternative energy sources, stockpiling, and




Several countries have a higher percentage of
their GNP which is exported, England and Germany for
example.
2 Unyusho Unyuseisakukyoku Johokanribu, ed. , Nihon
f
aiun no Genkyo (The Current Situation of Japanese
hipping) Tokyo: Nihon Kaiji Kohokyokai, 1984, p. 10, as
Quoted m Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Res5>onse to Threats of
hipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle East"
._-F5..
. .^^ ..^ TT -. 59^ ^^ 2, Summer 1986, p. 258.
also states that in 1983, Japan
^^t-^^ .^-^s^ ^^ , ^ , ^ , ^^-^ «ons . 46.2 percent was bound for Asia,
20.8 percent for the Middle East, 14.1 percent for North
America, 9.7 percent for Europe, 4.0 percent for Oceania,
and 2.9 percent for Latin America. Japan imported
547,360,000 tons: 26.4 percent from the Middle East, 23.1
percent from Asia, 19.3 percent from Oceania, 16.5 percent
from North America, 8.8 percent from Latin America, 3.6
percent from Africa, and 2.3 percent from Europe.
TABLE I: JAPANESE OIL IMPORTS (in percent ])
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Middle East 69.3 70.4 71.2 71.0 68.8
Southeast Asia 19.9 18.8 18.2 17.2 18.1*
N/S America 3.6 4.6 4.2 4.5 5.1
Africa 2.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.3
China/USSR 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.3 6.5
Includes 1.3 percent from Australia for 1985.
Source: Petroleum Association of Japan. Figures for
1980-84 are from Akaha, Tsuneo, "Japan's Response to
Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and
Japanese government assisted exploration projects
to diversify oil sources have been launched throughout
the world, and by 1982 about 9 percent of Japanese
imports came from Japanese companies. In spite of
this, Japan still depends on sea lanes from the Middle
East for three quarters of its oil.
Japan's efforts to cut its consumption of oil was
assisted when slowing economic growth lowered demand
and changes in the economy's industrial structure saved
an additional estimated 2-3 percent. Conservation cut
another estimated 2-6 percent. But by far the most
important factor was the development of alternative
sources, particularly coal. Through these measures the
percentage of the nation's energy supplied by oil
decreased from 71.1 percent in 1979 to 59.6 percent in
1984.3 The Japanese government intends to continue
this trend, targeting oil's share of the nation's




Coal, nuclear power, natural gas, geothermal power and
hydroelectric power will supply the rest.
Unfortunately, Japan imports most of its coal and
natural gas and, as of 1984, was still 83 percent
dependent on imports for its total energy
requirements.'* Despite all of these efforts, Japan is
still critically dependent on the sea lanes for its
energy.
The sea lanes are important not only for oil, but
for other natural resources and food as well. Japan is
dependent on outside sources for most of its natural
resources importing 99.7 percent of its iron ore, 96.5
percent of its copper, 78.1 percent of its lead, 55.6
percent of its zinc, 98.3 percent of its tin, all of
its nickel and aluminum, and 64.3 percent of its wood
and lumber. 5 Japan must also import food, even though
its agriculture is the most efficient and productive in
Asia. Only 15 percent of the land in Japan is arable,
but five million people work on it to produce an
amazing 72 percent of Japan's food. 6 Japan is self-
sufficient in rice, but only produces 34 percent of its
total consumption in cereals, 73 percent in fruit, and
80 percent in meat.''
The most important Japanese sea lanes pass through
the Southeast Asian straits--the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore and the Lombok and Makassar Straits. Of the
^
. Keizai Koho Center. Japan 1987: An
International Comparison . 19871 p! 59
.
5. Keizai Koho Center, p. 67.
6
.
Mcintosh, Malcolm, Japan Re-armed . New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1986, p.~"3i9": De Blij, Harm J., and
Muller, Peter 0. , Geography: Regions and Concepts . 4th
ed. , New York: John Wiley & Sons, 198b states, that
Japan raises approximately two thirds of its food.
Figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, Japan, as quoted by Keizai Koho Center, p.
17. list 63,988 metric tons of food imports of a total
134,187 metric tons domestic consumption, or
approximately 48 percent of food requirements are imported,
7. Keizai Koho Center, p. 17.
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140 to 150 ships passing through the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore each day, 44 percent of the ships over
30,000 tons are Japanese. Japanese tankers carry 74
percent of the oil transported through the region's
straits, supplying 85 percent of Japan's oil, 80
percent of its liquified petroleum gas, and 18 percent
of its coal.
Southeast Asia is also an important region of trade
to Japan. From the six members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) --Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Brunei—Japan
imports almost $20 billion, or about 15 percent of its
total imports, and exports nearly $15 billion,
accounting for over 10 percent of the country's world
wide exports. d Japan is the largest exporter to
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore and the
largest importer from Indonesia and Thailand.
To carry its imports and exports on the sea lanes
the Japanese operate more merchant ships than any other
nation, numbering 10,011 vessels as of July 1, 1986.
It is the third largest merchant marine in the world in
displacement, measuring 60 million deadweight tons.
9
Most of the Japan-bound shipping approaches from
the south terminating in Japanese ports on the southern
or Pacific side of Honshu (the largest island) . The
sole exception is Kitakyushu, which is on the northern
side of Kyushu and handles the trade from China and
Korea. The Yokohama port handles the largest volume of
shipping, freight which is bound for the Tokyo-Yokohama
metroplex. Following in volume are Kobe, the port for
the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto industrial triangle on the eastern
end of the Seto-Naikai (Japan's Inland Sea), and a
8. Akaha, p. 264.
9
. Keizai Koho Center, p. 27
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smaller port at Nagoya. (See Figure 1 for a map of
Japan's major sea lanes.)
A major conflict in the western Pacific would
disrupt these sea lanes. Closure of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore or the Straits of Lombok and
Makassar would force "shipping from the Persian Gulf to
Japan [to] be rerouted around Australia, [increasing]
the shipping distance by as much as 78 percent. "lo In
addition, warfare in the Pacific would cut the sea
lanes from Japan to the United States.
B. IMPORTAHCE OF SEA LANES IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE
Thus Japan's very livelihood—obtaining oil, food,
and resources for its industry- -shows how important the
sea lanes are to the survival and welfare of the
Japanese nation. Japan as a food-deficient resource-
starved island nation is aware of its dependence on the
sea. Therefore she must give major attention to the
problems of defending those sea lanes.
In determining whether Japan is adequately prepared
to defend its sea lanes, the following questions must
be addressed: Do the Japanese have a realistic view of
the importance of the sea lanes in the event of war?
How do the Japanese perceive the role of their sea
lanes in their defense policy? In the search for a
strategy, what capabilities for sea lane defense do the
Japanese have now? What are the challenges and
imperatives which must be addressed in the formation of
an adequate defense policy? How should the Japanese
defend their sea lanes? And finally, the question of
whether sea lane defense is the optimal Japanese
contribution to the U. S. -Japanese alliance will be
addressed.
10. Leifer, Michael, "The Security of Sea-lanes in
Southeast Asia," Survival . Vol. 25, No. 1, January-February
1983, p. 16.
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Figure 1: Japan's Sea Lanes
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C. HYPOTHESIS AND AIM
The hypothesis of this thesis is that if Japan were
to make marginal increases in its capabilities to
conduct air defense, strait control, and convoy
operations, Japan could defend its sea lanes against a
threat from the Soviet Union, releasing U.S. forces to
carry out offensive missions in accordance with the
American Maritime Strategy. It is apparent that Japan
does not have the capacity to singlehandedly defend its
sea lanes with its own forces as presently organized.
This thesis first analyzes the conflict in Japanese
perceptions of defense policy, the role of sea lanes in
current Japanese policy, and the factors involved in
the formation of current Japanese strategy.
Alternative strategies to defend Japanese sea lanes
will be examined.
Changes could be made in Japanese strategy that
would more effectively protect its sea lanes. Japan
already has a limited capability to protect the sea
lanes to the south of its main ports out to 1000
nautical miles. By concentrating military expenditures
on forces that make full use of the defensive
advantages of an island nation, Japan could have a
credible defense, even if there was a global war and a
Soviet attack on Japan.
The Japanese should concentrate on improving air
defense over Japan and the ocean between Two Jima and
Okinawa, enlarging their stockpile of mines and their
mine warfare forces, increasing the number of their
long range maritime patrol aircraft and the number of
their surface escort ships. These improvements would
maintain the defensive nature of Japanese forces and
are easily attainable within the next decade.
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II. ROLE OF THK SRA LANES IN WAR
The role of the sea lanes in war will depend on
what kind of war involves Japan. In "the event of a
fxill scale nuclear attack, the impact of the sea lanes
will be minor compared to the immense immediate
destruction. However nuclear attack appears to be both
the least likely conflict that would engulf Japan and
th^e conflict that Japan is the least able to deter or
defend against due to its public attitudes, population
density, and neighbors afraid of a resurgent Japan.
While the threat of nuclear attack can not be ignored,
a complete treatment is beyond the scope of this work,
which will briefly mention several factors that deter a
nuclear attack on Japan.
In a conventional war, Japan could be invaded or
blockaded by the Soviet Union, either in a global war
against the United States or in a regional conflict in
which the Soviet Union would be trying to gain a
territorial or strategic advantage, ie. , the
demilitarizatin of Hokkaido or restrictions on the
American use of Japanese bases. A blockade seems more
probable. In either case, protecting the sea lanes
would be essential for Japan's national survival.
The Japanese view the greatest threat to peace to
be the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is trying to expand its
influence around the world, deterred only by the
defense efforts of the U.S. and its allies. Tensions
also exist between China and the Soviet Union, and
North and South Korea. Other conflicts in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa make
the international situation "harsh, complicated and
14
fluid. "11 These conflicts are especially important for
their possible economic effects. But it is the Soviet
Union's "powerful military forces" which are increasing
the "latent threat" to Japan. 12
A. NUCLEAR WAR
The mere presence of nuclear weapons demands that
they be considered when analyzing defense strategy.
Even if nuclear weapons are not used they affect
strategy.! 3 However, this thesis does not consider the
aspects of nuclear war, as a preliminary analysis
indicates that it is the least likely danger
confronting Japan. Official statements indicate that
the Japanese are relying on the U.S. to deter a nuclear
attack on Japan.
Nuclear weapons would probably not be used against
Japan due to the dangers of escalation. The United
States is formally committed to defending Japan and
would be forced to retaliate against a nuclear attack.
Escalation is hard to control and this creates strong
pressure on both sides not to use nuclear weapons.
Both superpowers realize that their nations would be
devastated in a major nuclear exchange and seek to
avoid one. Limited nuclear attacks are also unlikely,
because the outcome of a limited exchange is uncertain.
The loss of one army, military base, or naval battle
group is not likely to be decisive but would provoke a
retaliatory strike of equal or greater strength. The
other power would almost certainly be forced to
retaliate, since failure to do so might be construed as
11. Defense of Japan 1986 . The Japan Times Ltd, 1986,
pp . 4 - 5
.
12. Defense of Japan 1986 . p. 24.
13. See Tritten, James John, CDR. USN, "(Non) Nuclear
Warfare," USNI Proceedings . Vol. 113, No. 2, February 1987
for a discussion of nuclear weapons in conventional war.
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weakness or a lack of resolve. The retaliation could
cost more than the original strike gained. Finally,
limited, or small-scale, nuclear weapon use is
problematic. A "small" nuclear weapon must be on
target. This is particularly troublesome if the target
is mobile, such as an army, a battle group or a convoy.
Near misses may not be devastating. If a nuclear
weapon fails to achieve a "mission kill" on its target,
then the escalation was not worth the risk. This
uncertainty is bound to make decision-makers hesitate.
History suggests that the principle of deterrence
may work. Opponents can independently conclude that
the disadvantages of using a particular weapon outweigh
its advantages. This reasoning prohibited the use of
chemical warfare in World War II. Also, wars have been
fought for limited objectives and with limited means.
Antagonists in the European wars from 1814 to 1914
deliberately limited war objectives to preserve the
opposing states and maintain the balance of power.
Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan are other examples of
limited wars.
A limited nuclear attack on Japan's ports would be
the most devastating. The argument against such a
clearly decisive, and destructive, act is that it would
demand retaliation from the U.S.
Nuclear attacks on convoys is another possibility,
but large merchant vessels may prove more resilient and
harder to destroy than supposed. Ships are resistant
to the blast and heat of a nuclear detonation. They
can also be sealed with watertight doors, to minimize
the effect of fallout. They can take evasive action,
scatter upon attack, and move away from the site of the
blast. Nuclear weapons would be more effective against
naval vessels, which tend to be smaller, and rely on
electronics, which are vulnerable to nuclear blast and
16
heat. A nuclear attack on a convoy of large merchants,
would cause a lot of damage, but would probably not
sink the majority of ships. And the U.S. could well
retaliate with nuclear attacks against bases which
launched the attack.
The Japanese adhere to the three non-nuclear
principles because as the Defense of Japan 1986 states
"Japan can not possess weapons systems which, from the
standpoint of their performance, are used exclusively
for the total destruction of other countries, such as
ICBMs and long-range strategic bombers. "i^ However,
the Japanese also officially state that, "against
nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear
deterrent capability of the United States. "is
Therefore, Japan's defense against nuclear attack
relies on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, as does NATO's.
The U.S. alliance system around the world depends on
the credibility of American willingness to retaliate
for a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons. The United
States would be forced to respond, and the Soviets must
realize this. A Soviet nuclear attack on Japan could
not go unavenged. This makes it unlikely.
B. CONVENTIONAL WAR
After the threat of nuclear attack, the most
serious danger to Japan is an invasion. But it is
clear from the limited number of Soviet amphibious
assault ships and logistics ships, that they do not
have the capability to launch a full invasion of Japan.
There is little incentive for a Soviet invasion and
numerous difficulties. It would be an extremely
difficult campaign. The mountains and steep valleys of
Japan provide excellent defensive positions. Even
14. Defense of Japan 1986 . p. 72
15. Defense of Japan 1986 . p. 80
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outnumbered defenders could inflict heavy casualties on
an attacker. Also the Soviets would be faced with a
horrendous logistic problem. Most of their invasion
supplies would have to be shipped from the
manufacturing centers in the western Soviet Union over
two rail lines. The supplies would then have to be
loaded on ships and delivered to a hostile beach
against vigorous U.S. and Japanese opposition. And the
Soviet Union would not gain much from outright
invasion. Japan lacks most natural resources and the
invasion would destroy Japan's industrial and
technological base. The Soviets would only gain
Japan's strategic position and deny Japanese bases to
American forces.
A limited invasion might be attractive however.
Securing the northern tip of Hokkaido and controlling
both sides of the Soya (La Perouse) Strait would
guarantee access to the Pacific Ocean from the naval
base at Vladivostok. A limited invasion would need
fewer supplies and make achieving local superiority
easier. Fewer assault and sunphibious ships would be
needed. Hokkaido is the most difficult island for the
Japanese to resupply and reinforce because it is the
most distant from the Japanese manufacturing and
population centers. In recognition of this danger, the
Japanese have stationed a large part of their ground
forces on Hokkaido, with plans to deploy land-based
surface-to-surface missiles.
However invading Japan would have the undesirable
effect of bringing the United States into the conflict.
This could be avoided by interdicting Japan's sea lanes
which would put tremendous pressure on the government
to accede to Soviet demands. This strategy would
probably be much more effective than invading the
Japanese homeland.
18
In the event of a general conventional war between
superpowers, the Soviets would want to keep Japan
neutral to avoid a two front war. The Soviets could
then concentrate on winning a decisive victory in
Europe, without having to divert vital resources to the
Far Eastern military region. If Japan were neutral,
the Soviet Union could demand that the Japanese
government restrict the American use of bases in Japan.
Behind this demand would be an implicit threat of
further action, such as air strikes against U.S.
facilities in Japan, a blockade to prevent the movement
of war materials in and out of Japan, an invasion to
seize control of the Soya Strait north of Hokkaido, or
possible nuclear attack. These would be powerful
incentives for Japan to stay out of a superpower
confrontation
.
A Soviet threat to interdict Japan's SLOC (sea
lines of communication) , if Japan refused to cease
aiding the Americans has several advantages. The
Soviets could claim that excessive Japanese support
for the U.S. is violating Japanese neutrality, giving
their actions some legitimacy. Also, it avoids hostile
acts on Japanese homeland, plays on the passivity of
the Japanese populace, and carries the inherent threat
of more severe measures if the Japanese do not comply
with Soviet demands. This would increase the political
divisions in Japan, with some Japanese urging an
accommodation to the Soviets and others calling for
resistance.
It is possible that the Japanese would seek to
maintain their neutrality and avoid the destruction of
war. In the short term, this course of action would be
possible. However the longer the war lasted, the
harder it would be for the Japanese to stay neutral
.
World resources would become increasingly scarce and
19
the demand for consumers goods would drop as shipping
was destroyed and the world economy turned to a war
footing. The demand for ammunition and war supplies
would skyrocket. Yet if the Japanese, attempted to
shift their industries to munitions, this would provoke
the Soviets. The Japanese would begin to experience
trade declines and economic dislocations.
In the long term, if the war lasted for a year or
longer, pressure from the Americans to actively support
the war would grow, especially if NATO suffered
reverses in Europe. Certainly from the American
viewpoint it would be desirable to strike the Soviets
in East Asia to keep Soviet Far Eastern Forces from
being diverted to the Central Front. The Americans
would also want to keep the Soviet Pacific Fleet
bottled up in the Sea of Japan, which would be
impossible without Japanese cooperation. As the war
wore on, American and Japanese interests would probably
tend to converge
.
A general war would restrict the flow of vital
resources, forcing Japan to use existing stockpiles,
and making Japan increasingly susceptible to SLOC
interdiction. Ironically, the most effective way for
Japan to stay out of a major war would be to be able to
independently protect Japan's SLOC's. This would
eliminate the "hostage" effect of a blockade, by giving
Japan the means to effectively counter sea lane
interdiction.
20
III. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY :
RECOGNITION OF THE SEA LANES
A. CREATING A CONSENSUS
Since the end of World War II, the role of sea
lanes in the Japanese defense debate has gone through
three phases. From the end of the war until the oil
shock of 1973, sea lanes were ignored. From 1973 until
1981 when Prime Minister Suzuki made the commitment to
defend sea lanes out to 1000 miles, the government
sought to deal with sea lanes indirectly by improving
diplomatic relations with suppliers and by diversifying
sources. Only since Suzuki's statement in 1981, has
the Japanese government began to create a new consensus
concerning what military capabilities are required to
defend Japan's sea lanes.
Two factors prompted development of Japanese
Defense policy: Japan's phenomenal economic growth and
the relative decline of U.S. power compared to the
build up of Soviet power in Japan's vicinity.
This chapter studies the evolution of Japanese
Defense policy from World War II to the present, noting
the institutions and policies distinctive to Japan that
form the background for the debate on the role of sea
lanes in Japanese security. The statements and
arguments of opposition parties, scholars, businessmen,
and military leaders are examined to show the differing
perceptions and shifts in thinking that reflect the
recognition of the importance of sea lanes.
The recognition of the importance that sea lanes
have in the defense of Japan was almost totally
inhibited as a result of the events of World War II.
Most Japanese blamed the military for Japan's defeat
and devastation, and felt that the military was anti-
21
democratic and had brought on an unnecessary war.i6
Thus suspicion and fear of the military are deeply
rooted in the Japanese society. This anti-military
sentiment persists today and is a critical factor in
explaining how defense policy evolves in Japan. i"'
The government must create a consensus to support
its defense policy, which involves devising compromises
acceptable to the majority. A discussion of the role
of sea lane defense in Japanese defense policy must
begin with a review of how the government built a
consensus for defense policy since 1945.
Two important historical facts provide a background
for the debate. Japan has never in its history been
successfully invaded, and was only occupied once, by
the Americans at the conclusion of World War II. This
means the Japanese are less concerned about external
threats and have given less attention to their security
requirements in the modern world. The other historical
factor is that since 1945, the Soviet Union has
occupied the "northern territories," four islands of
the Kurile chain claimed by the Japanese. These
islands lie across the sea lanes that the Soviet
Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok must transit to gain
access to the Pacific. The Soviet occupation of these
islands has prevented Japan and the Soviet Union from
signing a peace treaty to officially end the war, and
has created an adversarial relationship between the two
nations.
After the war U.S. forces under General Douglas
MacArthur occupied Japan, directed its disarmament and
18. Satoh, Yukio, "The Evolution of Japanese Security
Policy" Adelphi Papers . The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Adiard & Son Ltd. , Bartholomew Press,
Dorking, 1983, p. 2.
17. Weinstein. Martin E. , "Japan's Defense Policy and
the May 1981 Summit ' Journal of Northeast Asian Studies . 1
March 1982, pp. 29-32.
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sponsored a written constitution (1947), containing the
anti-war clause, Article Nine, which states:
Aspiring sincerely to an International peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as a
means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained.
She right .of belligerency of the state will not
e recognized.
This clause was enthusiastically endorsed by many
Japanese and institutionalized the public rejection of
the use of military force.
The Korean War precipitated a change in U.S.
policy. The movement of American forces into Korea
caused Gen. MacArthur to press the Japanese government
to assume more of the duties of policing Japan. In
July 1950, a para-military National Police Reserve
(NPR) of 75,000 was established. Prime Minister Ashida
justified this on the grounds that Article Nine of the
constitution did not prohibit self-defense. This
interpretation, known as the "Ashida-Kiyose
Interpretation", allowed the formation of a limited
self-defense force. 18
Most historians consider the formation of the NPR
to mark the beginning of Japanese post-war defense
efforts. However, the Japanese government, with the
acquiesence of the Supreme Commander For Allied Powers
(SCAP), had established the Maritime Safety Agency two
years earlier on 1 May 1948. This limited paramilitary
force of 10,000 men and 125 vessels was tasked with
patrolling coastal waters and sweeping mines. 1
9
18. Satoh, p. 2.
19. See James E. Auer's The Postwar Rearmament of
Japanese Maritime Forces. 1945-71 . Fraeger Publishers.
1973, pp. b3-«y, tor a detailed description of the re-
emergence of Japan's Maritime Self -Defense Force,
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In 1951 48 nations signed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty and at the same time the United States and Japan
signed a Security Treaty. The U.S. was fighting the
Korean War and desired Japan to rearm. In talks with
American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida vigorously opposed rearming.
Yoshida argued that Japan was a weak economic power,
Article Nine of the Japanese constitution prohibited
rearming, the Japanese people had a psychological
aversion to the military after the war, and a rearmed
Japan would create fear among its neighbors. Yoshida
proposed that the U.S. defend Japan in exchange for the
use of bases. This proposal was accepted. The basic
tenet of the Yoshida Doctrine, of cooperation with
American forces and reliance on the U.S. for defense,
has continued to be a central pillar of Japanese
strategy. 2
Shortly after the American occupation ended in
1952, the Japanese Diet passed the National Safety
Agency Law establishing the National Safety Agency.
This law redesignated the National Police Reserve as
the National Safety Force and increased its authorized
size to 110,000. Part of the Maritime Safety Agency was
redesignated the Maritime Safety Force also. The
National Safety Agency did not provide for defending
Japan from external aggression, however.
After the Korean War, the U.S. offered military aid
to its allies, but to be eligible Japan had to have a
detailed plan for defense. The Defense Agency Law of
1954 established the Japan Defense Agency and formed
the National Safety Force and Maritime Safety Force
into three distinct services: the Ground Self -Defense
Force (GSDF) , the Maritime Self -Defense Force (MSDF)
,
20. Mochizuki, Mike M. , "Japan's Search for
Strategy", International Security 8 . Winter 83/84, pp. 155-
161.
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and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) . (The Maritime
Safety Agency continued as a separate independent
service organized as a coast guard. ) On the same date
the Self-Defense Forces law was passed specifically
adding defense against direct aggression as a mission
and further delineating the structure, organization,
operation and status of the Self-Defense forces. The
exact mission of the MSDF was ambiguous however. The
Self-Defense Forces Laws simply states:
The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces
shall be to defend the nation against direct
and indirect aggression. .. it shall be the
mission... of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to
conduct operations chiefly at sea. . . .21
No other mission has ever been legislatively
authorized. For the first several years this was not
important because of the pitifully few ships assigned.
In 1956 the National Defense Council was organized
and proceeded to define a national defense policy. The
"Basic National Defense Policy" as recommended by the
National Defense Council was approved by the Cabinet on
20 May 1954. It stated:
The purpose of national defense is to
prevent direct and indirect aggression, and
once invaded to repel it in order to preserve
the independence and peace of Japan for the
blessings of democracy.
To achieve this purpose, the government of
Japan adopted the following principles:
1
.
To support the activities of the United
Nations and ix-s promotion of international
cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause
of world peace,
2. To promote the national welfare and
enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby
laying a sound basis for national security.
3. To develop gradually an effective
defensive power within the bounds of national
capabilities to the extent necessary for self-
dexense
.
4. To cope with aggression by recourse to
the joint security system with the United
States of America, pending effective
21
. Self Defense Forces Law, Law No. 165, June 9,
1954. The article quoted is from the Japan Defense
Agency, as quoted by Auer, p. 100.
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functioning of the United Nations in preventing
and removing aggressions. 22
Specific missions for the Self Defense Forces were not
listed, nor excluded.
This gave rise to a prolonged debate over whether
sea forces can be purely "defensive", what role the
MSDF should assume, and whether the MSDF should be a
limited, coastal defense force or an ocean-going navy.
Generally the civilian defense planners have argued
that there is a difference between offensive and
defensive warfare, that the MSDF should prevent
invasion, infiltration, sabotage and mining, and that
it should be a limited coastal guard force. The
leaders of the MSDF have tended to hold that there is
no difference between offensive and defensive warfare
at sea, that the MSDF must defend both Japanese
territory and ability to use the sea, and that an
ocean-going navy is required. 2
3
The Basic Policy for National Defense provided the
basis for four 5-year "Buildup Plans" from 1958 to
1976. While each of these plans doubled the defense
budget in real terms, the defense budget as a
percentage of the GNP actually grew smaller as the
Japanese economy expanded.
In 1960 the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty of 1951 was
replaced by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security (MST) because of Japanese fears that American
use of Japanese bases might involuntarily involve Japan
in a war. In the revision, the U.S. agreed to consult
the Japanese government on the use of those bases. The
Japanese agreed to accept responsibility for developing
limited means of initially resisting armed attack.
^^^^
22. Defense of Japan 1970 . The Japan Times, Ltd.,
1970, p. 2.
23. Auer, p. 133.
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until U.S. forces could come to their aid. The main
aspect of the MST was Article 5, which stated:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack
against either party in the territories under
the administration of Japan would be dangerous
to her own peace and safety and declares that
it would act to meet the common danger in
accord with its constitutional provisions and
processes. 2
4
Through the 1960 's Japan's economy greatly
expanded, but defense spending, decreased as a
percentage of the GNP. In 1967, Prime Minister Sato
announced that Japan would adhere to three Non-nuclear
principles: of not possessing nuclear weapons, not
producing them, and not permitting their introduction
into Japan. These principles have become a continuing
aspect of Japanese defense policy; reiterated on
several occasions by unanimous Diet resolutions and
reaffirmed by each succeeding government . 2 5 in the
same year the Diet passed a resolution eliminating arms
exports to communist countries, countries to whom arms
exports were banned by a resolution of the United
Nations, and countries engaged in international
conflict. In 1976 these restrictions were expanded to
preclude virtually Japanese arms exports altogether.
Most historians mark the end of the postwar period
in Japan by the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese
jurisdiction in 1972. This is a convenient political
event, but it was the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973, and
resultant shock to the Japanese economy, that brought
the divergence of Japanese and American interests into
sharp focus. This was the impetus for a new direction
in Japanese defense policy.
During the period of 1945-1973 the Yoshida Doctrine
was appropriate for Japan. It allowed the country to
24. Buck, James H. , Japan's Defense Policy, Armed
Forces and Society . Vol. 8, Fall 1961, p. 81.
25. Satoh, p. 5.
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porsue economic development and relegated defense to a
low priority. During this time Japanese debated the
issue of the legality of defense, not strategy. Sea
lane defense was dismissed as "too offensive" and "not
authorized." But by 1973 Japan had reestablished
herself diplomatically in the international community
and had emerged as an economic power. Japan outgrew
the Yoshida Doctrine. In the later part of this period
some Japanese began to air more self-interested views
on defense, such as the concern that American use of
Japanese bases during the Korean and Vietnam wars may
have endangered Japan more than protected it. 2 6 Up to
1973, Japanese defense policy was reflect-ion of what
the United States deemed appropriate for Japan. After
1973, Japan's policies exhibited increasing
independence from the United States.
The period from 1973 to 1980 was marked by a change
in the global balance of power and Japan's continued
economic growth. The United States ceased being the
world's predominant military power and began to rely
more on its allies. Western Europe, Japan, the newly
emerging industrialized nations of Asia, and the oil
producing nations Middle East gained in economic power
and international influence. The concurrent buildup of
Soviet power in the Pacific placed Japan in an
increasingly vulnerable position.
Japan's growing economic strength transformed the
trade relationship with the United States from one of
"economic partners" to "economic rivals." Controversy
erupted over textiles in 1971 and later over
soybeans. 2 7 The "Nixon Shocks" over the U.S.
rapprochement with China showed an American lack of
2 6
. Sayle, Murray, "The Yellow Peril and the Red
Haired Devils", Harper^ s . November 1982, p. 34.
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. Sayle, p. 35.
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concern for Japanese sensitivities. The Oil Crisis of
1973 revealed to Japan that the United States could not
provide oil in an emergency.
In addition, several events seemed to signal a
reduced U.S. presence in Asia. The American departure
from Vietnam and subsequent fall of Saigon in 1975, and
Jimmy Carter's proposal to unilaterally withdraw some
of the American troops from South Korea, seemed to
indicate an American unwillingness to meet security
commitments. In January 1979 Washington abrogated the
U.S. -Taiwan Defense Pact. Then the Iranian Revolution
and subsequent hostage crisis caused the U.S. to deploy
units from the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Oceans,
reducing its Pacific presence.
Meanwhile the international environment in Asia
grew more threatening. In 1978 Vietnam invaded
Kampuchea, followed shortly by a punitive Chinese
invasion of Vietnam. In 1979 the Soviets sent troops
into Afghanistan and began to use naval and air bases
in Vietnam.
These events changed the Japanese defense debate
from questions of the constitutionality of the Self
Defense Forces and whether or not to maintain the MST
with the United States, to a more practical appraisal
of an appropriate defense strategy for Japan.
Modernization of the SDF, closer cooperation with U.S.
forces, and a possible enlargement of Japan's role in
sea lane defense began to receive government attention.
The change became evident in The National Defense
Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976, which was the first
official Japanese definition of defense requirements .
The NDPO introduced the "standard force" concept; a
minimum force composition designed to repel a "limited
and small-scale aggression. " It did not recommend
increasing the size of the self-defense forces, but did
29
recommend modernizing its equipment and enhancing
Japan's air defense and anti-submarine capabilities.
Table II lists the NDPO force levels.
TABLE II: NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE
6SDF






ASW escorts flotillas 4 Flotillas
ASW regional district units 10 Divisions
Submarines units 6 Divisions
Minesweeping units 2 Flotillas
Land-based ASW aircraft units 16 Squadrons






Aircraft Control and Warning Units 28
Interceptor Units 10
Support/Fighters 3
Air Reconnaissance Units 1
Air Transport Units 3
Early Warning Units 1
High-Altitude SAM Units 6
430 combat aircraft (approx.
)
Source: Defense of Japan 1986
At the time the NDPO was released, the Miki cabinet
announced that defense spending would be limited to one
percent of the GNP, allaying fears that militarism was
rising in Japan. This was much less than most modern
industrialized nations spend, but the policy was
endorsed by each successive government until 1987.
The limit on defense spending served to allay
domestic and international fears of a rearmed Japan,
and also points out the fact that the Japanese
government was not turning to a military strategy for
the defense of Japan. As further evidence for this,
the late 1970' s saw a sharp increase in Japanese
economic assistance to Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and
Thailand. This was a natural outgrowth of the 1960 's
30
policy of economic diplomacy ( seikei bunri or
separating economics from politics) which enabled Japan
to trade with nations regardless of their espoused
ideology or political ties. In this way the Japanese
began to expand their foreign relations independently
of the United States. 2
8
Japan did not hesitate to maintain trade relations
with countries unfriendly to the United States. In
some cases Japan traded with co-belligerent states,
such as North and South Korea, and Iran and Iraq. For
example, Japan has assisted South Korea in establishing
heavy industry with loans and expertise. North Korea
was also encouraged to seek Japanese investment and
technology, but Japan has little influence there.
Japan does not officially provide any foreign
military aid. However, "in November 1982 Japan [made]
direct contributions to the United Nations peace-
keeping force in Lebanon in the form of funds and non-
combatant materials. "2 9 Japan also has been
contributing financially for many years to U.N. peace-
keeping operations, in Cyprus, on the Indo-Pakistan
border and in the Middle East.
Japan has continued this form of meeting its
international obligaions with finanacial assistances
and contributes aid to the Philippines, Thailand, Oman,
Pakistan, Jamaica, Turkey, and Central and South
America. Japan now provides the world's second largest
cunount of economic aid, known as Official Developmental
Aid (ODA) in Japan, to developing countries. Between
1986-90 this will amount to $40 billion. Japan also
contributes to China, ASEAN, Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania,
Sudan and Somalia.
28. Barnett. Robert W. , Beyond War . Pergaraon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1984, pp. ix-
XX.
29. Mcintosh, p. 36.
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However a purely economic diplomacy was an
inadequate policy in light of the increasing economic
power of Japan and the relative decline in U.S. power
compared to the Soviet Union. In April 1979, Prime
Minister Ohira appointed a committee, chaired by Dr.
Mascunichi Inoki, former head of the Japan Defense
Academy, to make recommendations on a Comprehensive
National Security. The recommendations were reported
to Ohira' s successor, Acting Prime Minister Ito in July
1980.30
In 1980, Prime Minister Suzuki felt that the Self
Defense Forces (SDF) were inadequate to repel an
invasion. This may have been encouraged by the comment
made by a Soviet diplomat to a Japanese journalist in
1978, that "the invasion of Japan would take only
several tens of minutes if we did it in earnest. "3
i
The SDF had low stocks of ammunition, poor air
surveillance (in 1976 a Soviet Mig 25 landed in
Hokkaido after flying around for over an hour without
detection), the BADGE air defense system was outdated,
and the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok was
expanding. To redress this imbalance the 1980
Comprehensive Security Group called for a 20 percent
increase in defence spending. The military budget has
averaged a 6 to 7 percent annual increase since.
The committee considered Japan's lack of resources,
the need to trade for survival, the reliance on the
American alliance, and its geo-political location in
making its recommendations on security policy. The
concept of Comprehensive Security combines diplomacy,
commerce, and military force, but considered the first
two more effective. It is based on the assessment that
the threat to Japan is less military and more likely to
3 0'. Barnett, p. 66.
31. Far East Economic Review . April 20, 1979, p. 29
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come from a collapse of international capitalism, an
oil shortage or protectionism. "In 1980 Prime Minister
Suzuki said, * We cannot protect Japan's security by
military force alone. An overall policy of diplomacy,
economy, and security is necessary. ' "3 2
The committe's second most important finding was
for the continued reliance on the Japan-D.S. Mutual
Security Treaty (MST). The Report on Comprehensive
National Security states that:
Japan's defense policy has been based on the
stance that Japan, under the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements, relies upon the United
States for nuclear deterrence and for the
repelling of large-scale aggression, and
resists small-scale and limited aggression with
conventional forces by itself... 3*
Implicitly this policy relies on the U.S. to protect
the sea lanes. Comprehensive Security is rooted in the
Yoshida Doctrine's reliance on the U.S. for security.
But it also recognizes that Japan must do more for its
own defense. The perception that defense was
becoming less a question of legality and more a
question of policy and therefore a legitimate
legislative concern open to public debate, was
reflected in the Diet's decision to establish Special
Committees on National Security in 1980.
The opposition parties also shifted their positions
on the MST, accepting all or part of the government's
security arrangements. Although the Democratic
Socialist Party (DSP) and Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
probably changed their position more out of concern
that the "Peace Constitution" might be revised, than
out of an acceptance of the principles of the MST, the
change is still significant. The DSP began supporting
the SDF in the late 1970 's and the Komeito Party in
1981. The JSP softened their support of an 'unarmed







neutralist' policy. Only the Japanese Communist Party
(JCP) called for the abolition of the MST, although
they supported independent military forces for Japan. 3*
This set the stage for the Japanese government to
expand its role in sea lane defense. Up to 1981,
Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was
restricted in its mission to within a few hundred miles
of the coast, and only then when there was a direct
threat to Japsmese territory. In 1981, the Japanese
government decided to expand the role of the MSDF to
include protection of its shipping. Prime Minister
Zenko Suzuki, in a meeting with President Reagan in May
1981, announced an increase in Japan's defense
responsibilities "in Japanese territories and in its
surrounding air and sea space" up to 1000 nautical
miles. 3 5 Suzuki's successor, Nakasone, reiterated this
policy in a January 18, 1983 interview with the
Washington Post , by stating that Japan would become an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier, " would extend its
"complete and full control" of the Japanese straits to
block passage of Soviet ships and submarines, and would
"secure and maintain" sea lines of communication. 3 6
(See Figure 2 for a map of the Japan and the three
straits.
)
In March 1983, Japan and the United States
conducted a joint study of sea lane defense, but it is
still unclear what role Japan will play. At first, the
Japanese government stated that the Maritime and Air
Self-Defense Forces would be expanded so that in
emergency situations they would be able to escort ships
carrying vital resources to Japan along the Tokyo-Guam
34. Satoh, p. 39.
35. "Japan-U.S. Communique," Japan Times . 10 May 1981
36. Bouchard, Joseph F. , and Douglas J. Hess, "The
Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense," United States Naval










Tb*rt mrt fiv Urai/\ leading into and out of the Sea of
Japan— Tartar, 5»ya, Tsugt^^ru, Tiushitna, and Shimonouki,
' All of them are generally shallower than 100 meters and
therefore are suitable for laying influence bottom-laid mines
for Its* against both submar\ln4S and surface ships.
m.4
*«
Figure 2: The Straits Into the Sea of Japem
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and Osaka-Bashi Channel sea lanes (between Taiwan and
the Philippines). Subsequent Japanese Defense Agency
statements indicate that sea lane defense will not be
restricted to particular channels, but will be the
result of cumulative efforts of anti-submarine patrol,
sea lane escort, and strait blockading operations.
The Japanese MSDF by itself does not have the
capabilities to counter the threat posed by Backfire
bombers and the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Therefore
Japanese sea lane defense is heavily dependent on close
coordination with the U.S. Navy.
The Japanese SDF may aid American forces inside the
Japanese defense perimeter in an emergency. But joint
operations with the U.S. Navy, in conditions less than
a direct attack on Japan, are controversial. Many
Japanese feel this is too close to the concept of
"collective defense," which is a violation of the
Japanese Constitution.
Given the close cooperation between the two
governments in this area, it is equally
understandable why many Japanese observers
suspect that Japan's own sea lane defense
development is designed not so much for the
country's own self-defense as for fulfilling
Japan's role in the anti-Soviet Western
alliance. "3?
The present government's position is that closing the
straits to the Sea of Japan, either alone or with U.S.
forces, is within the limits of self-defense, "but only
when the country is attacked or facing an imminent
attack. "3 8 As yet there is no consensus among Japanese
on this issue.
Several events have forced the Japanese government
to recognize the "potential" threat the Soviet Union
poses to Japan. On 1 September 1983 the Soviets shot
down a Korean airliner over Sakhalin to the north of
37
. Akaha, p. 273.
38. Bouchard and Hess, p. 92
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Japan. In 1985 the Soviet Pacific Fleet carried out a
its largest exercise ever in the waters surrounding
Japan. Other Soviet actions which have shocked the
Japanese include the stationing of Soviet forces on
Sakhalin and the disputed territories. In 1976 the
Soviets began to demand passports for Japanese visiting
graves on the Kuriles, and in 1977 they extended a 200
mile fishing zone around the island, excluding the
Japanese from one of the world's most productive
fishing areas and preventing the collection of seaweed
--a food staple.
Japan's economic growth, the changing global and
regional balance of power, and poor diplomatic
relations with it's powerful neighbor have caused many
Japanese to change their perception of Japan's role in
the world. Many officials of the government feel that
Japan should do more in its own defense. Some feel
Japan should defend its sea lanes out to 1000 miles.
But there is still no consensus on sea lane defense.
B. CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SEA
LANES IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE
Since 1945, the Japanese have had conflicting
perceptions about defense policy. The government, the
public, and the military have had differing views of
the threat and what constitutes the proper response.
Within each of these groups there is also considerable
divergence of opinion. As a result, Japanese defense
policy was the product of compromises over individual
policy decisions, and lacked the common view necessary
for a unified, comprehensive national defense strategy,
Scholars, journalists, politicians, businessmen,
bureaucrats, and military leaders have debated defense
in Japan. Several distinctive schools of thought have
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emerged from this debate and over the years the issues
have changed as perceptions of the external environment
and Japan's role in the world changed. Gradually, the
opinion that Japan has a legitimate right of self
defense has been accepted and the debate has centered
more over what that right includes.
Tetsuya Umemoto analyzed the statements of scholars
and journalist in Japan and found that the debate over
defense distinctly shifted to the right (that is, to
the belief that Japan has a legitimate right to self
defense) in the 1970' s.
He identified three schools of thought based on
values the proponents felt were most important to
Japanese society. He says, "National defense
presupposes a crisis in which a nation is confronted by
the necessity to sacrifice some values in order to
safeguard others. "3 9 The three schools of thought are:
"idealism," "realism," and "transcendentalism."
Idealism was strongest after World War II and gave
rise to "utopian pacifism" and the belief in "unarmed
neutrality" as the best course of action for Japan.
Idealism rejects the balance-of-power policy
along with Its derivative, the policy of
deterrence, nuclear or nonnuclear, as conducive
to arms race and war and dismisses Tokyo's
military efforts in accordance with the MST-SDF
formula as unnecessary, futile, and
dangerous. ^0
Idealists emphasized that the "safety and well-being of
individual citizens should take precedence over all
other objectives . "4 1 Everything was secondary to the
individual, even the survival of the state. The MST-
SDF formula refers to the Japanese reliance on the
Mutual Security Treaty with the United States for
T. ^,. A Umemoto, Tetsuya, Armg a i:^d^Aj-lian<?g in . Japai^ieg^Public Opinion . Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1985.T
40. Umemoto, p. 97.
41
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deterrence of nuclear attack and large-scale
aggression, and on the Self-defense forces for
deterring small-scale attacks. The idealists reject
this approach because they can not accept an individual
sacrificing his life to defend the state. Also the
idealists fail to see a significant threat to Japan,
since it is protected by water and, with no natural
resources, hardly worth invading.
The idealist position was challenged by the
realists who believed that the international system was
based on the balance of power and that peace was being
maintained by the superior military ability of the
United States.
Realism places power balance and deterrent
military capability in the center of its world
view, maintains that defense endeavors under
the MST-SDF formula are necessary, effective
(if carried out a little more vigorously,
smyway), and undangerous, but opposes such
endeavors coming into conflict with the essence
of the "institutionalized constraints. "4 2
The realists argued for strong ties with the United
States and development of the SDF under the
institutional constraints: Article Nine of the
constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, the
non-export of arms, and the limit on defense spending.
Umemoto finds that up to the late 1970 's the debate
over Japan's security policy was principally between
the idealists and the realists. But as Soviet military
power increased and American power declined, the
idealist argument lost some of its persuasiveness.
Since the late 1970 's most Japanese debate has shifted
from the idealist-realist controversy to the realist-
transcendentalist debate.
The transcendentalists argue that the "essence of
Japan" is necessary for the health of society. The
42. Umemoto, p. 197.
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individual must make at least some sacrifices to the
state.
The transcendental ists hold that the SDF must be
expanded beyond the limits of the institutional
constraints. The MST is unequal, and therefore must be
abolished: It demeans the sovereignty of Japan. The
transcendentalists agree with the realists that power
is the basis of the international system. But the
transcendentalists would remove the limits to military
growth
.
Transcendentalism finds common ground with
realism concerning the balance of power and
deterrence as well as the necessity of military
undertakings in the context of the alliance
with the United States, but asserts that such
undertakings will remain woefully ineffective
unless steps are taken fundamentally to alter
or scrap tne "institutionalized constraints. "43
The realists and the idealists disagree on the
nature of the international system, but they both agree
that the strength of the SDF must be limited. With the
rising awareness of the expansion of Soviet power,
Umemoto says the debate between the transcendentalists
eoid the realists has become predominant.
Another American specialist on Japanese defense,
Mike Mochizuki (Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Yale University) similarly describes
Japanese strategic thinkers but divides them into four
schools by separating the realists into two groups.*
4
Mochizuki 's divisions include the "unarmed neutralists"
(moderate-to-far left), "political realists"
(moderate/left), "military realists" (moderate/right),
and "Japanese Gaullists" (far right). 4
5
43. Umemoto, p. 198.
44. See Frank Langdon's "The Security Debate in
Japan," Pacific Affairs . Vol 58, No. 3, Fall 1985, for a
similar view of this debate.
45. Mochizuki^ Mike M. , "Japan's Search for
Strategy", International Security 8 . Winter 83/84, p. 158
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The unarmed neutralists (Umemoto's idealists) and
Japanese Gaullists (Umemoto's transcendentalists) are
fewer in number and less influential than the realists.
The political realists and military realists are well
represented in the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and
the government. The political realists constitute the
mainstream of Japanese politics, carrying on in the
Yoshida tradition. But the military realists may be
growing more influential as indicated by the term of
former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, perhaps the
best known military realist.
According to Mochizuki, in the 1970' s, the unarmed
neutralist's argument that the U.S. -Japan Security
Treaty endangered Japan lost some of its persuasiveness
due to the American withdrawal from Vietnam, U.S.-
Soviet detente, and, later, the U.S. -China
rapprochement. The collapse of detente has caused the
unarmed neutralist's to restructure their arguments to
block the expansion of the Japanese military and the
incorporation of Japan into American military strategy.
The Japan Peace Research Group, headed by Yoshikazu
Sakamoto of the University of Tokyo, serves as a focal
center for the unarmed neutralists. Some other noted
strategists of this school include Takeshi Ishida,
Kinhide Mushakoji, Hiroharu Seki, Jiro Kamishima,
Takehiko Kamo, Hisao Maeda, Michio Morishima, Shigeto
Tsuru, and Masashi Ishibashi, a member of the Japan
Socialist Party.'*
6
The unarmed neutralists argue that the Soviet Union
is not a realistic military threat to Japan. Hisao
Maeda makes this argument in an article he wrote for
the Japan Quarterly , saying:
The recent noisy farce of the budget-compiling
process suggests that it is more correct to
regard the threat to Japan as coming from the
46. Mochizuki, p. 163.
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pressure of the United States, not the military
Buildup of the Soviet Ur " ""
would like to force Japc»„ ww w^**>- v»^ -w-
military strength and integrate it into U.S.
_„ nion. The United States
pan to build up its
global military strategy-. In fact, even if thejoviet Union were building up its military
force as insisted by the United States and the
Defense Agency, this would not be directly to
Japan's disadvantage.'*"'
The unarmed neutralists argue that Japan is much more
threatened by its economic vulnerability due to its
dependence on imports of raw materials and exports to
foreign markets. They favor terminating the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty to prevent Japan from being dragged
into a superpower dispute, and the signing of
friendship treaties with Japan's neighbors. The
neutralists oppose revising the constitution or
relaxing any of the constraints on a military buildup.
Regarding military forces, the unarmed neutralists
oppose further expansion of Japan's military cuid
propose reinforcing civilian control of the SDF.
Despite Japan's dependency on the sea lanes, the
unarmed neutralists oppose the development of a large
navy. They cite the inability of Japan's large
Imperial Navy to secure the sea lanes during World War
II as proof of the futility of such a strategy today.
Although the unarmed neutralists have little direct
impact on policy, the widespread public appeal of their
pacifistic arguments constrains government action. *s
Mochizuki feels that the influence of the Japanese
gaullists was greater in the post-war period but has
declined through a lack of support in the government or
the public. The most prominent gaullists include Jun
Eto, Tetsuya Kataoka, Yatsuhiro Nakagawa and Ikutaro
Shimizu.
*T
. Maeda, Hisao, "The Free-Rider Myth", Japan
Quarterly . Vol. 24, April/June 1982, p. 176.
4«. Mochizuki, p. 164-5.
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The Japanese gaullists fear the Soviet military
threat and doubt the U.S. will keep its commitment to
defend Japan. They desire a complete revision of the
security treaty to place Japan and the United States in
an equal alliance. The gaullists argue that Japan can
not be a sovereign nation until the political system is
transformed and Japan has an independent military
commensurate with its economic strength. Tetsuya
Kataoka, in Waiting for "Pearl Harbor" , argues that
this transformation will result from a national
security crisis.
The most likely form the Japanese state will
take on the morrow of a security crisis is
Gaullism: Japan will be fully capitalist, but
more republican than democratic in character;
she will be a true equal of the United States
in a defensive alliance and an even stauncher
friend than today; but she will ask for
autonomy in defense of the western Pacifiers
The gaullists propose revising the constitution to
remove Article Nine, and removing the institutional
constraints imposed on defense policy.
The gaullists desire military forces capable of
national power projection and independent deterrence.
A representative study by the Military Science Research
Group calls for the development of nuclear weapons,
four carrier task forces, and seventeen destroyer
escort flotillas. The ASDF should have 350 F-15
interceptor aircraft, 30 early warning aircraft, and
300 hundred tactical bombers. The GSDF's armored
component should be increased from its present 48 tanks
per division to 200 or 300. However the gaullists
influence remains limited. so
The political realists, Mochizuki states, are "the
inheritors of the Yoshida strategy and now form the
49. Kataoka, Tetsuya. Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor".
Hoover Institution Press, 1980, p. 'I.
50. Mochizuki, p. 168.
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mainstream of Japanese strategic thought. "si They are
most concerned with the political and diplomatic
implications of security policy, and the trade-offs
between economic welfare and military expenditures.
The political realists oppose the development of
autonomous defense because of the economic and
political costs. The Research Institute for Peace and
Security (RIPS) is their main strategic research
center. The president of RIPS is Masamichi Inoki and
other members include Masataka Kosaka, Seizaburo Sato,
Fuji Kamiya, Shumpei Kumon, Masamori Sase, Masashi
Nishihara, and Kiroshi Kimura. Yonosuke Nagai is
another well-known political realist who is not a
member of RIPS.
The political realists fear losing the U.S.
security guarantee, the danger they see from the Soviet
Union is more political than military, and they are
concerned by Japan's economic vulnerability. Some
advocate stockpiling key resources and others favor
using economic assistance programs to foster close ties
with critical suppliers of raw material and other
strategically important countries. Political realists
want to strengthen the U.S. -Japan security alliance by
sharing more of burden of western defense. They do not
see any need to revise the constitution or the U.S.-
Japan security treaty.
Most political realists feel that the force levels
outlined in the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
are sufficient in quantity but should be qualitatively
improved. The 1980 Report on Comprehensive National
Security (RCNS) accurately and succinctly portray 's the
political realists position. It criticized the combat
capability of the SDF and the lack of an integrated
command and control between the three services. It
51
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recommended a 20 percent increase in the defense budget
to qualitatively improve the SDF so that it would have
a "denial" capability against "limited and small-scale
aggression." The RCNS mentions the importance of
securing the sea lines of communication, but does not
specifically assign that mission to the MSDF. The
report does not mention other missions such as blocking
the three straits or contributing to the U.S. Seventh
Fleet during a Middle East crisis. Some political
realists support the NDPO's concept of a force balanced
among the ground, maritime, and air forces, and while
others reject the NDPO and favor enhancing one or the
other of the services. 5
2
The political realists are the dominant school of
strategic thought in Japan and have the most influence
over policy. Generally, they seek improvement of
Japan's global image and accommodation with the United
States. In the words of Masahi Nishihara:
With its much larger economic power than in
1960, and with feelings of greater threat to
its security interests, Japan is gradually
sharing its international responsibilities in
defending the interests of the free world.
What is emerging is a sense of alliance, by
which Japan has resolved to ally itself more
closely with the West. 5 3
Mochizuki feels that military realism is a new
strategic perspective which arose as a result of the
changes in Japan's external environment, particularly
the relative decline of American global power and the
trade frictions between the U.S. and Japan. The
military realists are likely to have a significant
impact on Japan's effort to form a new strategic
doctrine. Hisahiko Okazaki is the most widely
published representative of this school. Others are
52. Mochizuki, p. 162.
53. Nishihara, Masahi, "Expanding Japan' s Credible
Defense Role", International Security. Vol. 8, No. 3,
Winter 83/84, p. 2Ub.
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members of the Japan Center for Strategic Studies
(JCSS), their main research center, including Shin
Kanemaru as president, Noboru Minowa, Masao Horie,
Shigeto Nagano, Kenichi Kitamure, Ryuhei Ohga, Goro
Takeda, and Jun Tsunoda.5 4
The military realists begin by assessing the most
likely military threat and then devise a strategy to
meet it. Unlike the political realists, the military
realists do not believe that a distinction can be made
between a potential adversaries' s intentions and
military capabilities. Therefore, they focus on
military capabilities. The military realists favor
closer military cooperation with the United States and
analyze the threat to Japan in terms of the global and
regional U.S. -Soviet military balance. Nuclear parity
between the superpowers and the loss of American
conventional superiority in the Pacific due to the
Soviet buildup, have brought into question the U.S.
ability to deter war. Therefore Japan must examine the
possible scenarios which could involve it in war.
The military realists believe that Japan's position
on the three straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima)
through which the ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
must pass to get to the Pacific, mean that Japan can
not remain neutral in a superpower confrontation. A
quote by Hisahiko Okazaki illustrates the logic of
military realism.
It is natural for a major country to occupy a
strategically important area before an
adversary takes it. Particularly if a country
occupies a geostrategically important place and
is not sufficiently prepared for the defense
either by its own forces or by an
alliance. ... These facts are sufficient to
refute an argument by Japanese leftists that
Japan will be involved in the war because of
the existence of American bases in Japan, and,




the Security Treaty is not securing
the peace but endangering it. 5
5
At the least, Soviet air and naval power would threaten
Japan, and the Soviets might attempt to seize the
northern tip of Hokkaido to guarantee passage through
the Soya strait. The military realists believe the
only way to prevent this invasion is to make a Soviet
attack in East Asia extremely costly. 5 6
To accomplish this, the military realists want to
strengthen the U.S. -Japan Alliance. Autonomous defense
can not guarantee Japan's security. Only an increase
in Japan's defense capability coupled with closer U.S.-
Japan defense cooperation can do that. All military
realists support increased defense spending, but there
is disagreement over whether it can be done in the
existing legal structure. Some military realists argue
that the U.S. -Japan security treaty and the
constitution must be revised. Others insist that the
treaty and constitution can be reinterpreted to provide
the legal framework. 5 7
The military realists argue that the SDF under the
NDPO force levels are both "quantitatively inadequate"
as well as "qualitatively deficient". In view of the
Soviet interest in securing use of the three straits,
and its ability to pressure Japan by interdicting the
SLOCs, the military realists emphasize the importance
of defending the straits and adjacent territory, and of
SLOG protection. These missions require expanding the
NDPO force structure.
In a report presented to the Japanese government in
1981, the military realists in the JCSS recommended
force increases to carry out these missions. To defend
55. Okazaki. Hisahiko, A Grand Strategy for Japanese
Defense . University Press of America, iy«b, p. IZ^
.





Hokkaido and the Soya strait the report called for
eleven interceptor squadrons, four support fighter
units, an air defense missile unit, and additional
ground forces. The NDPO only calls for ten interceptor
squadrons and three support fighter units. Some
military realists also call for the formation of a
seaborne assault brigade and an airborne division. To
defend against the air threat to Japanese SLOCs posed
by Soviet Backfire bombers, the report recommended
stationing long-range fighter squadrons and airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) units on the Benin
(Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan) islands. Against the
Soviet submarine and surface ship threat to the SLOCs
the report would add more P-3C land-based anti-
submarine aircraft and equip them with harpoon (anti-
ship) missiles. In addition, the report called for
another unit of anti-submarine helicopters, one or more
additional escort flotillas beyond the four designated
in the NDPO, and several nuclear powered anti-submarine
submarines. Finally the report recommended improved
minelaying capabilities for strait defense and forming
a missile ship unit for operations in the Japan Sea and
around Hokkaido. 5 8
Most realists do not advocate a Japanese nuclear
force: relying instead on the United States. The
military realist doctrine could be called "joint U.S.-
Japan deterrence," with the U.S. supplying the nuclear
aspect and the offensive part of the conventional
deterrence, and Japan supplying the defensive forces of
the conventional deterrent. In the 1970 's most of the
military realists were retired military officers, but
in the 1980 's many government officials and scholars
have adopted this view.
58. Mochizuki, p. 175
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The four schools are divided by their view of the
threat to Japan, and what the appropriate response
should be. Each sees sea lane defense in a different
light. The unarmed neutralists see no military threat,
oppose the expansion of the military, and feel that the
sea lanes can not be protected. The gaullists fear the
Soviets and doubt the American commitment to Japan.
They seek an independent deterrent and desire a strong
navy including aircraft carriers and seventeen
destroyer escort flotillas. The political realists
fear the Soviets but rely on the U.S. deterrent. They
want to improve the quality of the SDF to show their
willingness to share the burden of defense, but not
their size. They recognize the importance of sea lane
defense, but make no provision for it. The military
realists are alarmed by the Soviet threat and America's
decline. They want to strengthen the U.S. -Japan
alliance, and upgrade the Japanese capability to defend
the sea lanes by increasing the quality and the size of
the armed forces.
Most Japanese defense commentators fall into one of
the four schools, although each has his own variations.
And, of course, all of the schools include adherents
from different segments of Japanese society. But
groups, such as political parties, businessmen, and
military leaders, with common beliefs or interests tend
to have similar views of sea lane defense. These
groups have significant influence on policy and will be
examined next.
The individual opposition parties in Japan have not
affected security policy directly because the LDP has
been in power for the last thirty-two years. However,
as a group, they influence the LDP by forming
coalitions, arousing public opinion, and forcing
compromises in the Diet.
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The defense positions adopted by the opposition
parties are affected by considerations of how to gain
political advantage or support. Thus their shifts on
defense issues indicate their perceptions of public
opinion. Since the late 1970' s, the three of the four
major opposition parties have shown an increased
acceptance of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and a
greater role for Japanese in defense. The defense
positions of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Komeito (Clean
Government Party) , and the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP) will be examined next.
The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has steadfastly
demanded the abrogation of the U.S. -Japan Security
Treaty. They also call for the dissolution of the SDF
as presently constituted because they see it as a tool
of the "reactionary" American imperialists. Once the
MST is dissolved, Japan should organize an independent
military which will guarantee its status as a neutral
nation.
The JSP is the largest opposition party,
consistently receiving from one quarter to one third of
the vote. In the early 1950 's the JSP vigorously
opposed the LDP government's defense policy,
championing the cause of unarmed neutrality. The
security treaty with the U.S. was regularly denounced,
although the specific proposals for its termination
were never officially stated. The JSP's position on
the SDF was tempered by a readiness to consider certain
conditions that must be met before their
disestablishment.
Toward the end of the 1970 's the JSP also began to
state that certain preconditions were required for the
termination of the U. S. -Japanese alliance. The JSP
Central Executive Committee in September 1979 declared
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its policy to be one of "entering into negotiations
[with the United States] with a view to abrogating the
Mutual Security Treaty. "59 At about the same time, JSP
also linked severing the MST with the transformation of
the international situation around Japan. At this time
the JSP also stated that abolishment of the SDF would
take into consideration "political preconditions such
as popular domestic support and relaxation of global
and regional tension. "6
o
By the 1980 's the abrogation of the MST had become
an ideal or long-range goal of the JSP, and it
concentrated on impeding the growth of Japan's military
contribution to the U.S. -Japan alliance. On the SDF
the JSP also softened its stance further, formally
declaring that it would limit its efforts to ensuring
civilian control of the military and to cutting defense
spending. By opposing the enlargement of the SDF, the
JSP tacitly accepted their existence. In February
1984, the party national convention advanced the
"unconstitutional but legal" theory, justifying its de
facto recognition of the SDF, arguing that they exist
legally on the basis of Diet decisions.
The Komeito, formed in 1964, has shifted its
position on defense the most drsimatically of the four.
At first it sought "phased liquidation" or "early
liquidation" of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. The
Komeito challenged the constitutionality of the SDF and
called for reorganizing the SDF into an acceptable
"Territorial Guard Force. "6i
The relaxation of tensions in Asia in the early
seventies led the Komeito advocate the "immediate
59. Shakai Shinpo . (semiweekly newspaper put out by
the JSP), 11 September 1979, as quoted by Umemoto, p. 168.
60. Umemoto, p. 172.
81. Umemoto, p. 164.
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denunciation" of the MST and to declare that the SDF
was designed to serve U.S. interest. However, by 1975
its official policy on the MST had softened to
"abrogation by consent through diplomatic
negotiations. "6 2 And then for the years 1975 to 1980,
its policy statements did not mention the
unconstitutionality of the SDF at all.
The Komeito party convention in 1980 struck out the
negative characterization of the Mutual Security
Treaty, and stated that its abrogation would take place
in the future, if it should at all. By 1981 the
Komeito recognized that the MST was "playing a certain
role as a deterrent in the security of Japan, " and was
ready to support retention of the MST until an
improvement in the international environment. In the
same year the Komeito gave its stcunp of approval to the
SDF by stating that "the present Self -Defense Forces
and the capability to preserve territorial integrity as
advanced by the CGP [Komeito] had much in common. "6 3
But the Komeito has steadfastly refused to accede
to Japan's assuming more of the defense burden with the
United States, or to revising the National Defense
Program Outline, or to breaking the one percent limit
on defense spending. It has especially opposed the SDF
participation in sea lane defense.
Since its formation in 1960, the DSP has rejected
the immediate denunciation of the MST in favor of
"phased liquidation," holding that abrogation of the
treaty would create a power vacuum around Japan, In
lieu of its eventual liquidation the MST would be
revised to remove its most irksome drawbacks (such as
the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan). The DSP
62. Umemoto, p. 161.
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upheld the necessity for a minimum of military-
capability, but was vague about the role the SDF should
have in the security pact with the U.S.
By the early 1970 's the DSP was more inclined than
ever to renounce the military pact with the United
States. However in November 1975, the DSP began to
move away from terminating the alliance and began to
acknowledge the positive aspects of the security pact.
The DSP began to view the function of the SDF in light
of military burden sharing.
In its annual policy statement in 1980 the DSP
declared the force levels in the NDPO inadequate and
began to call for its revision. The national
convention, in February 1981, advocated "firm
maintenance" of the bilateral military tie and
"concretization of the Guidelines for U.S. -Japanese
Defense Cooperation, " accepting the necessity for
greater military burden sharing. 6
4
Recently the DSP has assumed that defense spending
would inevitably exceed the one percent limit and have
generally favored expanding the roles of the SDF.
The national convention has since 1982
continued to approve a policy statement
containing passages to the effect that the
Japanese military should not confine itself to
the defense of its homeland but assume
responsibilities for ensuring the safety of the
sea lines of communication. 6
5
In addition, the DSP supports studies on how the
Japanese should assist the U.S. in emergencies outside
their territory. The DSP has come to support the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty as fervently as the LDP and is
more supportive of increasing Japan's military posture
than the LDP.
64. DSP, Compilation of DSP Decisions at the 27th





In summary, of the four leading opposition parties,
three have been moving steadily away from abolishing
the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty with the United
States, adopting positions less antagonistic to the
existence of the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty.
The DSP is the more supportive of a greater role for
the MSDF in sea lane defense then the ruling party.
The Komeito is only willing to accede the SDF the
capability to defend Japan's territory, not sea lane
defense, but refuses to increase their capabilities.
The JSP wants to cut defense spending and insure
civilian control of the Self Defense Forces. It
opposes adding the mission of sea lane defense to the
SDF. All three want to maintain the institutional
constraints in the constitution, the three non-nuclear
principles and the principle of non-export of arms. 6
6
The JCP wants to abolish the SDF in favor of a
autonomous Japanese military. In general, though, the
opposition parties positions on the SDF have become
more supportive since the late 1970' s. Having
discussed opposition parties, the role of business will
be examined next.
In Japan, business, politics and government are
closely interrelated. Edwin 0. Reischauer described
the relationship this way.
The Japanese have often described the symbiotic
relationship between politicians, bureaucrats,
and business leaders m terms of Janken, the
?aper-scissors-stone game of Japanese children,
he conservative politicians depend on the
money of business: business depends on the
administrative rulings of the bureaucracy; nd
the bureaucracy depends on the political
decisions and Diet votes of the politicians. 67
For the most part decisions are made based on prior
consultation between the three groups.
66. Umeraoto, p. 174.
6 7
. Reischauer, Edwin 0. , The Japanese . Harvard
University Press, 1977, p. 292.
54
Business plays an important role in Japan's Defense
industry. Japan has always emphasized domestic
production of defense material. In 1969 Japanese
manufacturing made 97 percent of its own ammunition and
84 percent of its aircraft, tanks, guns, and ships. 6
8
This tendency has continued. It should be noted
however, that for most of the munitions producing
firms, defense contracts are only a small percentage of
their total output. The largest producers of defense
related material tend to be the least dependent on
defense contracts.
Business in Japan is represented by four principle
organizations. The Federation of Economic
Organizations or Keidanren is the strongest and most
influential, containing only big business and large
government cooperations. Small and medium sized firms
are represented by Nissho . or the Japan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. The Japan Committee for
Economic Development, Keizai Doyukai . founded in 1946,
was originally concerned with rebuilding Japan's
industry. It supports a progressive capitalist
economy, but generally avoids defense issues. The
Japan Federation of Employers' Association, the
Nikkeiren . was founded to oppose militant labor unions,
but now works to promote the interests of both labor
and management . 6
9
The Keidanren has a special group, the Defense
Production Committee (DPC) which oversees the interests
of the defense industries. The DPC, funded by the
Japanese Munitions Industry Association, is widely
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Japanese business is generally in favor of a
stronger defense. Takeshi Sakurada, president of the
Mkkeiren . stated, "Japan should produce more defense
aLrms for itself... and spend every penny it can on
defense. "'0 The DPC has proposed that the government
double its funding of defense research and Nissho and
Keidaren recommend that the ban on arms export be
relaxed. 71 But the business community's influence on
defense policy and programs is modest, and defense
production is only a small part of its total output.
Another group that affects government policy in
Japan is the news media. The press and television
exert political influence, by disseminating facts or
selecting which facts to report, and by encouraging the
public to adopt certain societal values.
The five big daily newspapers are divided by size
of circulation into the "big three," the Asahi . the
Mainichi . and the Yomiuri . and the "lessor two," the
Nikkei , and the Sankei . All five of these newspapers
have similar format. They are the primary vehicles of
the Japanese opinion makers, the journalists, academics
and prominent personalities.? 2 Of these, the
newspapers are the most important since the "big three"
blanket Japan twice a day and the country's readership
per capita (548 papers published per 1000) far exceeds
that of any other industrial society. Television news
programs appear to have a very limited impact on the
public. 7
3
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The press takes a persistently liberal or "dovish"
position and generally opposes government positions on
defense issues. For example, during the 1960's, the
majority of the press opposed the Japan-United States
Security Treaty, questioned the constitutionality of
the Self Defense Forces, decried the presence of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Japan, and fought against breaking
the one percent limit on defense spending. But lately
the news media has not represented the majority
opinion. For 20 years after 1945, the majority of
Japanese were attracted to * Utopian pacifism* , but,
since about 1965, they have outgrown pacifism much
faster than the press and appear to accept the world as
it is with a "mixture of cynicism and sophistication."
The "Big Three" newspapers have consistently challenged
the constitutionality of the SDF, but public support
for the SDF has increased over the years, until it is
now over eighty percent. 7
4
During most of the 1970s the "big three" took an
idealistic view. Their editorials slanted toward
applying the brakes to military improvements,
discounted the external threat, and warned about the
danger of being dragged unwillingly into a war because
of the MST. They did not advocate breaking the treaty
or abolishing the SDF however. On the other hand, the
"lessor two," adopted realist inclinations, stressing
the "balance of power as the keystone for a nation's
security" and "highlighting the importance of military
capability to deter aggression. " Nikkei and Sankei
firmly supported the SDF and the security treaty with
the United States. However neither one ever advocated
that the "institutional constraints" be exceeded or
182, International Institute for Strategic Studies, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 46.
74. Nishihara, "The Media. .." , p. 49.
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abolished. In this they adopted the realist view that
the SDF could made strong enough in the existing
framework.
Then in the beginning of the 19803 the Yomiuri
shifted from the idealist view to a realist view. That
is, "it has come to look upon international relations
in balance-of-power terms, stress the significance of
military deterrence, and in consequence stand behind
defense efforts. "7 s This shift may have been the
result of changing public opinion, but is more likely a
reflection of a perceived change in the international
environment, (such as the death of detente) and a
growing perception of the threat to Japan.
Some analysts believe that the Japanese news
media's influence on defense issues may be
overestimated. Masashi Nishihara observes that:
For the past thirty years, some major
newspapers have persistently criticized the
Liberal Democratic Government for it
conventional rearmament programmes, begun in
1954, and pressed their pacifist or 'dovish'
views. But that has not prevented the Liberal
Democrats from forming the Government for the
entire postwar period. 7
6
This may be true. It is also true that the LDP has
presided over one of the most prosperous periods in
Japan's history, and that could be a more significant
reason for the LDP's long reign in office.
The Japanese public is very conservative,
unconcerned with foreign affairs, and politically very
passive. Most do not identify strongly with a
political party and avoid politics. Consequently, the
Japanese public accepts the status quo for the most
part and supports government policy. In view of this,
it is not surprising that, public opinion has moved
gradually from the idealist to the realist position.
75. Umemoto, p. 138.
76. Nishihara, p. 45.
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That is, most Japanese accept the balance of power
theory as the best explanation of the international
system, but also believe that the size of the military
must be limited.
Certain elite groups in Japan have characteristic
political opinions. Journalists, newscasters, and
university professors tend to have leftist leanings,
especially the educators. These elites are usually
outside the decision-making process. They express
their ideas in articles, but have little direct impact
on policy. Other elites in Japan, bureaucrats,
politicians, businessmen, and professional military
officers tend to be conservative. They have strong
ties to the government and support its policies.
A shift of a different sort is noticeable in the
official statements of the Japan Defense Agency ( JDA)
.
Before examining the JDA's positions on sea lane
defense, it must be noted that the JDA does not have
the same influence on defense policies as the military
departments of most nations. The Director General of
the JDA is not a cabinet member and the JDA as an
agency has a lower standing than the government
ministries such as the Foreign Ministry, the Finance
Ministry, and the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry. The JDA is directed by civilians, and thus
has a less military character than defense departments
of other countries. This is clearly evident in the
JDA's policy statements, which until the late 1970 's
stressed diplomacy as the key to national security.
Recently the JDA has placed more emphasis on analyzing
the military threat and developing the appropriate
force levels, including the possibility of more far-
ranging missions for the MSDF, such as sea lane
defense.
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In 1970 the JDA published the first an annual
Defense White Paper. For the first few editions Soviet
activity around Japan was depicted in charts and
graphs, but labeled "unidentified" to avoid
antagonizing the Soviet Union. No country was pointed
out as a threat to Japan.
By the mid-1970 's, while still naming no threat to
Japan, the JDA's White Papers warned that although a
Japanese military buildup would raise concern among
Japan's neighbors, a "power vacuum" would also be
destabilizing. The White Papers of 1977-78 stated that
the Japan-U.S. security treaty made "...full scale
armed aggression against Japan. . .hardly conceivable.
But limited aggression may be considered a
possibility. "77 Diplomacy remained Japan's primary
defensive action.
In 1978, the JDA's White Paper noted that the
United States no longer had military superiority over
the USSR in all areas. To gain support for SDF
improvements, the JDA pointed out the role of the
military in "comprehensive security" and that if
deterrence should fail, military power "becomes the
most important means to protect the country's
independence . "7 &
The JDA watched buildup of Soviet Pacific Fleet in
the 1970' s, marked by an increase in naval units, the
addition of an aircraft carrier, and deployment of
Backfire bombers to the Far East, with concern. The
JDA's 1979 White Paper observed:
The Soviet Union is now strong enough to
compete with the U.S. in nuclear war capability
in general as well as in conventional war
capability in Europe and the Far East... the
Soviet Union is making it difficult for the
77. Defense of Japan 1977 . p. 23
78. Defense of Japan 1978 . p. 20
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The Soviet Union was referred to as an "increased
potential threat." But the JDA did not propose an
increase of the targeted NDPO force levels. Noting
that previous acquisition programs had failed to
achieve these goals, the White Paper urged they should
be "reached as soon as possible. "8
The Soviet Union was still a "potential" threat to
Japan in following White Papers. And the military
situation continued to be analyzed in terms of the
Soviet-U.S. balance, as though Japan were only an
observer.
As the relative power of the U.S. in Asia declined,
the JDA began to proclaim a need for greater SDF
capabilities, although always within the context of the
U.S. -Japan security arrangement. In the 1982 Defense
White Paper, the JDA observed that "military power is
indispensible for national security and also forms part
of the framework of the international order. "^i While
the JDA defended the necessity of military power, it
also recognized the role of the U.S. -Japan security
treaty. The JDA maintained that Japanese defense
rested on three pillars: a strong public will for
independence, effective development of defense
capabilities, and the U.S. -Japan security treaty.
In 1982, Director General Ito of the JDA,
summarized the views of the JDA on defense. 8 2
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Japan must be responsible for protecting itself
but "minimal" self-defense should not be
exceeded.
2. The Soviet military buildup was mainly a
reaction to China and the other Pacific
nations
.
3. The restrictions of the Constitution and the
4.
three non-nuclear principles should be upheld.
Japan's defense capability is insufficient, but
it is growing steadily.
5. Japan should assume more of its defense burden
(.within constitutional constraints).
6. It is doubtful that current defense goals can
be^reached with less than 1% of GNP going to
defense each year.
7. The 1976 NDPO should not be revised. Instead,
goals listed should be achieved in a timely
manner
.
The JDA desired an increased defense budget, citing the
difficulties of attaining the NDPO goals within the one
percent limit, but did not call for increasing force
levels above the NDPO levels. Instead the JDA proposed
to build up the SDF by improving and modernizing
existing forces.
In the official statements of the JDA, there is a
steady gradual shift towards identifying a definite
threat and desiring a more capable defensive force.
But the JDA is not the most vocal proponent of larger
forces and an increased role for the SDF. The JDA
recognizes that its existence is still challenged by a
substantial minority of the Japanese and is careful not
to overstep its accepted limits. Whatever the JDA
officials say in private, they are careful to maintain
a correct public image. For example, Japanese Defense
Agency is still careful to make a distinction between
the capability to attack and the intention to do so.
For this reason the Defense of Japan 1986 states that:
"The Soviet Union deploys powerful military forces in
the area around Japan. . .
.
[This] increases the latent
threat to Japan. [author* s emphasis] . "8 3
There is no consensus over the appropriate military
strategy among the three Self Defense Forces either.
«3. Defense of Japan 1986 . p. 24
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Each proposes a strategy that supports its claim on the
defense budget. This is not surprising. But before
considering the current interservice debate, an
examination of the historical background of the debate
over the role of Japan's maritime forces will
illustrate its unchanging character.
The debate over the role that naval forces should
play in the future defense of Japan began immediately
after the conclusion of World War II during the
American Occupation. As James E. Auer substantiates in
his book The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime
Forces. 1945-71 . some form of Japanese naval force has
existed continuously since the end of the war. Auer
says:
Naval activities by the Japanese took place
throughout the Occupation; a uniformed,
organized naval force, first a remnant body,
but later an entirely new organization, which
testifies to its military character by-
deploying into combat, existed prior to the
Korean War; and that the events of Korea,
rather than triggering the first steps of
rearmament, at least as far as a Japanese navy
is concerned, merely demonstrated to Occupation
and to Japanese authorities that a
strengthened, more professional navy was
necessary .84
Thus in reality the debate was not over whether or not
Japan should have naval forces, but over their form and
role.
The postwar development of Japan's maritime forces
was directed by pressing needs. The immediate problem
after the Japanese surrender was clearing mines.
Consequently the Japanese Navy was directed by U.S.
forces to commence minesweeping. These units were
later put under the command of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and
finally under the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Japan.
Postwar smuggling and illegal entry into Japan from
Korea, created a problem. To meet this need, on August
28, 1947, two months after the promulgation of the
84. Auer, p. 37.
63
postwar constitution of Japan banning sea forces,
twenty-eight former vessels of the Imperial Japanese
Navy were transferred to the Japanese Ministry of
Transportation by SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Forces
Pacific) for coastal patrol purposes.
This force's size and missions were undefined,
leading to calls from some officials of SCAP, some
members of the Allied Council for Japan, and the Far
Eastern Commission, for definite limitations on the
organization. Therefore in April 1948, (two years
before the outbreak of the Korean War and General
MacArthur*s call for creating the National Police
Reserve) the Maritime Safety Board Law established the
Maritime Safety Agency, as an official coast guard. It
could not have more than 10,000 personnel or 125 ships.
Although the MSA's mission was vague, its immediate
duties were clear--minesweeping and coastal patrol.
Operating as a uniformed naval force when the
Korean War began, Japanese minesweepers were deployed
to Korea and used extensively in support of U.N.
forces. Their professional efforts in support of the
Wonsan landing are well known.
In July of 1952, the National Safety Agency Law
established the National Safety Agency redesignating
the National Police Reserve as the National Safety
Force, and the Maritime Safety Force as the Coastal
Guard Force. No new missions were assigned to Coastal
Guard Force, but it did not matter because there were
so few ships. The first frigates and landing craft
received from the U.S. were used for training and the
minesweepers kept sweeping. 8
5
In June 1954 the National Safety Agency Law of 1952
was completely amended to create three separate Self
Defense Forces: the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF),
85. Auer, p. 128.
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the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) , and the Maritime
Self Defense Force (MSDF)
. For the first three years
no explicit duties were spelled out in public policy.
The JMSDF forces simply trained and swept mines.
The formation of the National Defense Council in
1956 and its document defining national security, the
"Basic National Defense Policy," sparked an intense
debate over the role of the MSDF that has continued
along the same lines to the present. The debate is
over four questions. Is there a difference between
offensive and defensive war at sea? Can a navy adopt a
"purely defensive" strategy? What is the role of a
navy? Should Japan have an ocean-going navy or a
limited coastal defense force? Until this debate is
resolved, Japan will not have a maritime strategy . Q
6
The civilian defense planners at the JDA tend to
hold that there is a difference between offensive and
defensive sea warfare; and that the MSDF should be
oriented toward preventing invasion, infiltration,
sabotage, and mining. They envision the MSDF as a
coastal defense force.
The leaders of the MSDF question the difference the
planners make between offensive and defensive warfare
at sea. They argue that to defend Japan against
"direct and indirect" attack it is necessary to protect
the sea lanes. They feel that because Japan is a
maritime nation, an ocean-going navy is required. «
7
Auer illustrates the nature of this debate by
outlining the "visions" of two representative
proponents. A brief description of their positions
will be examined because the debate is the same today
as it was then. Kaihara Osamu, a former head of the
Defense Bureau, maintains the "minimalist" view, while
88. Auer, p. 133.
87
. Auer, p. 133.
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Sekino Hideo, a retired commander in the Imperial
Japanese Navy represents the "expansive" view,
Kaihara points to the defeat of Japan's merchant
shipping in World War II as proof that merchant fleets
can not be defended. A small island nation like Japan
can not overcome the twin damaging characteristics of
its geography and lack of resources: There is no room
to retreat and regroup, and Japan will always be
vulnerable to blockade. The overpowering strength of
the Soviet Union makes any defense of sea lanes
ludicrous. Protecting the sea lanes is unauthorized by
the constitution, unrealistic because of the vast areas
that must be defended and the tactical advantages of
the submarine, and impossible because Soviet submarines
greatly outnumber Japan's escort forces. The only
authorized, realistic, and sensible role for the MSDF
is that of a coastal defense force. Defense of the sea
lanes should be left to the United States in exchange
for use of Japanese bases. 8*
Sekino disagrees. Japan's geostrategic location
and lack of resources require a strong navy. Sekino
holds that securing the sea lanes is difficult, but not
impossible. Furthermore, in the event of a direct
invasion of Japan, Sekino argues that the United States
has an obligation to defend Japan, and will do so. But
the U.S. has no obligation to defend Japanese shipping,
and against a sea lane interdiction campaign, Japan may
have to stand alone.
To accomplish this, in wartime Sekino would reduce
the amount of shipping to half the normal peacetime
level and limit the areas where it sailed. A "Maritime
Safety Zone" would be established south of Japan and
defended by fixed sonar stations on islands and hunter-
killer groups of destroyers, aircraft, and submarines.
88. Auer, pp. 134-139
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Shipping of high value or in certain high risk areas,
would be protected by convoys. Air defense would be
provided by basing VTOL fighters on islands and
improving the air defense over Japan. Soviet
submarines would be destroyed as they attempted to pass
through the three straits to exit the Sea of Japan. In
the event of an invasion, the same forces that protect
the sea lanes would intercept the invading force and
destroy them at sea.*
9
The Japanese government has never decided in which
direction the MSDF should develop, resulting in a "non-
policy. " As Auer says:
The government has remained content to allow
civilian defense planners to put forth their
views on a limited, effective anti-invasion
security force; but it has also allowed the
MSDF leadership supported by conservative
foliticians and business elements to build some
ong lead-time naval vessels which could be
used for a future ocean-going navy able to
Srotect Japan's interests in local and more
istant waters. It has most of all allowed the
Finance Ministry to keep defense expenditures
very low. . .90
The lack of a strategy makes it difficult to achieve a
capability for sustained operations, since under the
present "civil-planner, uniformed leader, finance-
official limited-say, participatory Ringi or torimatome
system, a consensus is achieved bureaucratically. "9i
Auer's comments are as appropriate today as when
they were written. The debate over the nature of the
MSDF still goes on. It is interesting to note, that of
the approximately sixty major vessels in the MSDF, half
are organized into escort squadrons without territorial
obligations and half are assigned to regional
districts. The NDFO describes the missions for the
latter group as "units assigned to coastal surveillance
89. Auer, pp. 139-142





and defense, surface anti-submarine capability of at
least one ship division. .. in each assigned sea
district" (coastal patrol?). 9 2 This indicates that
there is still no concensus on the employment of the
MSDF. (These MSDF ships are in addition to the ships
of the Maritime Safety Agency which are completely
independent.) In comparison, the U.S. Navy, with its
"forward defense" strategy is completely organized in
squadrons, built around a deploying battlegroup.
Unfortunately, in addition to the debate about the
form of the MSDF between the JDA and the MSDF, there is
considerable interservice rivalry among the three
services. Naturally each service seeks to protect its
share of the defense budget and promotes appropriate
defense strategies to accomplish that end.
The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) considers
invasion to be the most serious and likely threat
facing Japan. Due to the proximity between Hokkaido
and the Soviet held territory around it, and the
strategic value of controlling the Soya strait, the
GSDF concentrates its forces in the defense of
Hokkaido. Yoshihisa Nakamura, a Lt. Colonel in the
GSDF and a professor of military strategy at the
Japanese National Defense University ( Boei Daigaku )
,
has analyzed the interservice rivalry in Japan. He
says the GSDF feels a limited Soviet invasion to secure
the use of the Soya strait is the most likely threat.
The GSDF deploys about two thirds of its tank forces on
Hokkaido to deter such an attack. In the event
deterrence fails, the GSDF proposes to resist the
invasion and to protect the airfields on Hokkaido. To
accomplish this the GSDF favors three policies:
building more tanks, expanding the reserve ground
92. As quoted in Defense of Japan 1986 . p. 259.
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forces to 300,000, and increasing the air defense of
Hokkaido. 9 3
Whereas the GSDF believes the greatest threat is to
the north, Professor Nakamura says the MSDF looks to
the south. The MSDF argues that Japan is highly
dependent on oil imports and that the Soviets are more
likely to interdict Japan's sea lanes than to invade
Hokkaido. To defend this argument, the MSDF points out
that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has few amphibious
assault ships. Professor Nakamura alleges that the
MSDF wants to control the straits with surface ships
and submarines rather than with less expensive mines,
as this strategy supports a larger fleet.
According to Professor Nakamura, the ASDF is
ambiguous over the missions of defending Hokkaido and
the sea lanes. The ASDF's highest priority is to
defend the island of Honshu, and it assumes the U.S.
Air Force will take the offensive against the Soviets.
The ASDF does not have tanker aircraft and so can not
protect the sea lanes any great distance from Japan.
The ASDF wants more emphasis on early warning,
including airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft, and over-the-horizon radars, and tanker
aircraft.
This interservice rivalry is an impediment to the
development of a national defense strategy. To be
implemented, a sea lane defense plan must contain a
role for each of the services.
Each strategic school of thought and group of
elites in Japanese society has its own particular view
of the international environment and what is in the
best interests of Japan. An examination of all these
opinions over the last ten years reveals a widespread
93. Nakamura, Yoshihisa, lecture on "Japanese Seirvice
Strategies" given at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, Ca. on 24 August 1987.
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tendency to become more accepting of the legitimacy of
the defense forces of Japan, and a growing feeling that
Japan may be threatened in the future and should do
more to defend itself. For some groups, this means a
recognition of the importance of the sea lanes and
support for the MSDF to assume a larger role in
defending them. Whether this was caused by government
action, changes in the balance of power, or the
Japanese people's perception of themselves as a nation
is not important to the question of sea lane defense.
What is significant is that there appears to be grounds
for the formation of a new consensus on defense: one
that includes a greater role for the SDF in the defense
of Japan's sea lanes.
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IV. THE JAPANESE SEARCH FOR STRATEGY
IN SEA LANE DEFPINSE
The last chapter found that the role of sea lanes
in Japanese Defense policy is receiving more attention,
the government appears to be attempting to create a new
consensus on defense, and that members of Japanese
society have conflicting perceptions on defense and the
proper role of sea lanes. This chapter examines the
government's present position on sea lane defense,
current Japanese military capabilities, assistance that
Japan may receive from her neighbors, and assesses
current Japanese strategy.
A. THE GOVERNMENT POSITION ON SEA LANES
Nakasone's term as Prime Minister enlivened the
Japanese debate over sea lane defense and revived
western hopes of a greater Japanese contribution to
defense. A 1987 commentary illustrates the feelings of
Japan's allies.
Mr. Nakasone deserves credit for pushing his
country's defence policy above that famous
spending ceiling of 1% of GNP and towards
adequately doing the things Japan can to
contribute to the free world's defence:
protecting its own territory and the sea lanes
around the Japanese archipelago, and providing
American with intelligence about Russian's
Pacific fleet. The gentle rise in defence
spending should continue until Japan can carry
out those tasks. "9 4
Nakasone expanded on his predecessor's
acknowledgement that Japan could protect its sea lanes
out to 1000 miles. In January 1983, Prime Minister
Nakasone declared that, in his view, Japan should
prevent Soviet Backfire bombers from penetrating into
the Pacific, control the straits surrounding Japan, and
94. The Economist . "Who Will Lead Japan?" 22 August
1987, p. it:
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"secure and maintain the sea lines of communication" to
Japan. 9 5 Nakasone also expressed enthusiasm for mining
the straits in an emergency, to bottle up the Soviet
Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan.
Prime Minister Nakasone seemed eager for Japan to
assume greater responsibilities for defense, but his
feelings were not always representative of the official
government position. For example, in response to U.S.
requests that the Japanese provide minesweepers or
financial support in the Persian Gulf, Nakasone told
the Diet on 22 August 1987 that dispatching a
minesweeper force to the Gulf is "legally possible. "^^
However, Yoshifumi Matsuda, the Foreign Ministry's
chief spokesman, later said that Japan could not send
ships or military personal to the Gulf. "The
government's 'legal position,' he said, is that
minesweeping by Japanese forces in international waters
is not barred, but that the interpretation is based on
protecting sea lanes around Japan. "97
Nakasone 's efforts to break the one percent limit
on defense spending, though ultimately successful, were
resisted by public opinion and some of his own LDP
members
.
The 1976 cabinet decision to limit military
expenditures to one percent of GNP proved to be a
formidable obstacle. Although the limit will be broken
this year, it won't be by much. Spending in fiscal
year 1987 is estimated at 1.004 percent of GNP. 98
95. Tokinoya, Atsushi, "The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A
Japanese Perspective," Adelphi Paper 212 . London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, p. 5.
96. Butts, David, "Japan should help protect Gulf,"
United Press International . 14 September 1987.
9 7
. Schweisberg, David R. , "Japan Studying Aid to
U.S. in Gulf," Unitea Press International . 10 September 1987
98. Shapiro, Margaret, "Japanese Agency Asks
Immediate Defense Buildup, " The Washington Post . 29 August
1987, p. A20.
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Even with the one percent limitation, Japan's defense
budget is large, ranking ninth in the world in 1984.
Significantly, Prime Minister Nakasone's attempt to
explicitly abandon the limit in 1985, was decisively
defeated within the LDP. Yet the defense budget was
increased almost 7 percent in 1985, a year when most
other budgets remained unchanged. However, the
increase will not be enough to reach the goals of the
Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate. As of May 1984, 27
percent of the 1983-87 targets, based on the 1976
National Defense Program Outline, had been attained,
when 40 percent attainment had been projected. In the
recent period of slowing economic growth, the
government's efforts to increase the defense budget
have had to be reconsidered in light of falling
revenues and growing budget deficits. "The
government's new policy is to hold down defense
spending to 18.4 trillion yen for the five-year fiscal
1986-90 period in terms of fiscal 1985 costs. "99 U.S.
officials have been calling for Japan to develop the
capabilities to defend its sea lanes by 1990, but, if
the Japanese defense budget is limited to "about" one
percent of GNP, that deadline is unrealistic. i oo
With strong support from Nakasone, the Japanese
Defense Agency was able to increase the defense
spending for fiscal year 1986 by 6.58 percent to US
$16.5 billion. More significantly, in an effort to
overcome the shortcomings of the Mid-Term Defense
Program Estimate in meeting the goals of the 1976
outline, and to upgrade the Defense Agency level
document to cabinet level, on September 19, 1985, the
government decided to reinstate the cabinet-level
99. Kvodo News Service . "Gist of Defense White
Paper," 28 August 1987.
100. Akaha, p. 274.
73
defense buildup plan approach. This elevated the build
up plan from the status of an agency plan, to having
the official approval of the cabinet. Under the new
five-year plan (1986-90), the SDF would meet the goals
of the 1976 outline. Even with that force structure,
however, the Japanese SDF would still not have enough
assets to be able to adequately defend its sea lanes.
The new five-year defense build-up plan, calls for
the procurement of 50 additional P-3C anti-submarine
aircraft, 63 F-15 fighter planes, 9 new escort vessels,
and 5 E-2C patrol planes, to replace existing obsolete
equipment. In weapons procurement and development, the
MSDF is placing an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) weapons systems, including putting the AN/SQR-18A
tactical towed-array-sonar on helicopter carrying
destroyers, licensed production in Japan of the P-3C
Update II ASW patrol plane and the Mk-46 Mod 5 ASW
torpedo, and procurement of two SH-60B airframes in
preparation for producing the helicopter in Japan. In
advanced anti-submarine warfare technology, the MSDF is
critically dependent on the U.S. While some officials
in Japan view this dependency as necessary in order to
standardize weapons system and enhance
interoperability, critics claim that such dependency
will inevitably lead to Japan's increasing
vulnerability to political whims in the United
States. 101
The emphasis on air defense capabilities and anti-
submarine warfare indicates the intention to defend
Japan's sea lanes. Recent government statements seem
to bear this out. A Japan Defense Agency spokesman
stated:
Japan will introduce a sophisticated radar
system and warships armed with new ship-to-air
missiles in its new military program to defend
101
. Akaha, p. 275.
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°9f^'^^ shipping lanes , a Japanese defense agency
official said today. 102
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated that "the
maintenance of ocean shipping safety is a matter of
life and death. "i 03 Seiki Nishihiro, the director of
the defense bureau of the defense agency, explained
that the program to protect Japan's sea lanes will be
implemented in three stages.
The first stage will set up facilities for
early detection and monitoring of invaders.
The, second will be a system of patrolling
fighter aircraft to eliminate threats to
shipping. The third stage of the plan will be
to protect Japanese ships from attacks.! 04
The latest defense White Paper defended the JDA
against charges of renewed militarism, reaffirming
civilian control over the military and blaming the
Soviet military build up for an increased "latent
threat" to Japan. It notes that Japan's geographical
location hinders the Soviet Union's route of advance
into the Pacific, the sharp increase in military
cooperation between the Soviets and North Korea, and
the construction of a large-scale phased array radar
network encircling the entire Soviet Union. 105
The Defense of Japan 1986 contains the Japan
Defense Agency's new view of the threat. The Soviet
Union is able to confront the United States on both the
nuclear and conventional level . A quarter to one third
of Soviet military forces are deployed near Japan. The
Soviets have deployed the new type TU-95 Bear-H
bombers, capable of carrying AS-15 long-range cruise
102
stage PI -^ _w ^^ a , -. ^ .
translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
103. Kyoto News Service . "Japan Introduces Three-
stage Plan ^o Defend Shipping Lanes," 17 July 1987.
104. Kyoto News Service . "Japan Introduces Three-
stage Plan to Defend Shipping Lanes," 17 July 1987.
105. Shapiro, Margaret, p. A20 . See also Christian
Science Monitor, 11 Sep 87.
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missiles equipped with nuclear warheads in the Soviet
Far East, along with some 170 SS-20 intermediate range
nuclear missiles and about 85 TU-22M Backfire bombers.
The SS-20 missiles, each carrying three nuclear
warheads, are capable of reaching Japan within ten
minutes of launching. The Backfires, deployed east of
Lake Baikal and on the shore opposite Sakhalin, have a
range of 4000 km, carry the AS-4 air-to-surface
missile, and thus can strike the sea lanes around
Japan. About 390,000 troops, or 43 divisions, out of
the entire Soviet ground force strength of two million,
or 211 divisions, are deployed in the Soviet Far East,
roughly east of Lake Baikal. About 840 ships,
including 75 nuclear powered submarines, out of the
Soviet Navy's total of about 2,980 ships, are stationed
in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Soviet Air Force has
about 8,840 combat aircraft, of which about a quarter,
or 2,390, are deployed in the Far East. These include
about 460 bombers suspected of conducting "attack
training" exercises against Japanese Air Self Defense
Force radar sites. The Soviet Union also appears to be
building a new type over-the-horizon radar to detect
aircraft in the Pacific. 106
As for sea lane defense operations, the Defense of
Japan 1988 . notes Japan's dependence on the sea lanes,
and states that enemy submarines, aircraft, or surface
ships may attack vessels on the sea, or lay mines. To
counter this:
The SDF will carry out various operations such
as patrol, escort t air defense and protection
of ports and straits to check for or diminish
the enemy forces and prevent the enemy'
s
effective operations and, with the cumulative
effects of these operations, the SDF will
106. Kvodo News Service . "Gist of Defense White
Paper," 28 August 198Y.
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ensure the safetv of maritime
transportation . i o 7
Defense of sea lanes out to 1000 miles is not mentioned
specifically. The routes or destinations of the sea
lanes, or plans to convoy merchant vessel, are not
discussed either, indicating that there is still a lack
of official consensus on sea lane defense.
While some officials of the Japanese government
have called for an expanded Japanese role in sea lane
defense, including commitments made to the United
States by two Prime Ministers, there are other
officials who oppose such a role. This inability to
form a consensus prevents the formation of a definite
policy regarding sea lane defense. However it appears
that the proponents of an expanded Japanese role in sea
lane defense have grown more influential in the
government. While it is not clear yet what view the
new Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita, will take,
judging from the government's past behavior, a radical
change in Japan's security posture should not be
expected. A continuation of the gradual build up of
military capabilities is more likely. Japan's present
capabilities for sea lane defense will be examined
next.
B. JAPANESE CAPABILITIES FOR SEA LANE DEFENSE
Most American military analysts, eager for Japan to
build up its military capabilities, feel the Self
Defense Forces do not compare in size or offensive
capabilities to most modern military organizations.
Other analysts feel Japan has considerable military
power. For example, Malcolm Mcintosh writes:
With fifteen submarines, the Japanese rank
eighth in the world; with fifty-four combat
surface vessels they come fifth in NATO
107. Defense of Japan. 1986 . The Japan Times, Ltd.,
1986, p. 95.
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ranking; . . .with 800 aircraft (including over
300 combat aircraft) they rank fifteenth in the
world. .. .They also have developed sophisticated
missiles and, reputedly, the world's best anti-
submarine sonars. Overall some experts rank
the Japanese forces as the sixth largest in the
non-Communist world. los
The truth is somewhere in between. Japan is not a
major military power, but its forces, though weak in
particular capabilities, have considerable means of
defending its sea lanes.
To protect its sea lanes out to 1000 miles Japcui
must accomplish three missions: control of the air over
Japan and the sea lanes to the south, the ability to
move merchant vessels safely through the sea to the
southern ports of Japan, and control of the three
straits into the Sea of Japan. An accurate analysis of
Japan's capabilities to accomplish these mission is
required to determine an appropriate strategy for sea
lane defense.
For air defense the ASDF operates about 311 combat
aircraft organized into 6 combat air wings and one
combat air group. Japan has 11 fighter-interceptor
squadrons. Four squadrons are comprised of 83
Mitsubishi/McDonnell-Douglas F-15J/DJs. (The "J"
designation signifies that they were produced in Japan
and contain some modifications.) Six contain 110
Mitsubishi/McDonnell-Douglas F-4/EJs, and the remaining
squadron is composed of 30 Mitsubishi/Lockheed F-
104J's. The main armament for these aircraft is the
U.S. sparrow or sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM)
.
For reconnaissance and electronic warfare, the ASDF has
one squadron of 10 RF-4EJ and one wing with 6 Grumman
E-2C. For ground support, it has 50 Mitsubishi F-l's
in three squadrons, and 20 Kawasaki C-l's, 10 NAMC YS-
11' s and 4 C-130H's for transport. Nineteen squadrons
of Nike-J surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, totalling
108. Mcintosh, p. 144-47.
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180 launchers defend the ASDF's facilities. The Nike-J
SAM'S are being replaced by the more capable Patriot
system. 1 9
The ASDF's ability to defend the air space over
Japan and the surrounding oceans is constrained by its
proximity to Soviet bases and a deficient early warning
system. It needs more radar sites and capable airborne
early warning systems. Additional radar sites and
bases on the islands to the south of Japan are required
to extend air protection over the sea lanes. Moreover,
the ASDF does not have any airborne tankers, which
severely limits the combat range of their interceptors.
Finally, given the numbers of Soviet aircraft, it is
unlikely that the ASDF could adequately defend the huge
additional ocean area without more interceptors.
For sea control, the Japanese Maritime Self
Defense's (MSDF) main force consists of 34 destroyers
and 18 frigates, for a total of 52 open ocean escorts.
Of these, 28 are organized into four ASW groups and the
rest are assigned to regional districts. The newer
anti-submarine (ASW) ships are modern, capable and
efficient. But the force as a whole is limited in
anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-ship missile defense
(ASMD). Only five have more than a short range (25 km)
amti-air warfare (AAW) capability. 27 have either the
phalanx close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) or sea sparrow,
or both. The other 25 have no air defense other than
guns. The JMSDF does not operate an aircraft carrier,
so it must rely on shipboard anti-air missile systems
and land based air support for protection against
attacking aircraft. This is a serious weakness because
in war the JMSDF will be operating within range of
109. All figures on aircraft and air defense are from
The Military Balance 1986-87 . International Institute for
Strategic studies, iy86. Defense of Japan 1986 lists
similar, although in some cases. slightly smaXXer figures.
The later figures from The Military Balance were used.
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land-based Soviet aircraft. The JMSDF force of 52
combatants is simply not large enough to carry out the
missions of defending the waters around Japan,
blockading the straits, conducting anti-submarine
patrols, and protecting the sea lanes out to 1000
miles.iio
The JMSDF surface force is critically weak in other
areas also. Only 22 ships are armed with the Harpoon
surface-to-surface missile and some ships still carry
the obsolete Mk 44 torpedo as their primary ASW weapon.
There are only two underway replenishment vessels, and
no more are planned, restricting the surface fleet's
operating areas and ability to stay on station.
The JMSDF has the world's fourth largest mine
sweeping force, and one of the most modern. This first
rate force of 42 vessels includes one command ship, two
support ships, six tenders, and a squadron of
minesweeping helos (7 total). Minesweeping is a time
consuming operation, however, and with Japan's
extensive coastline, 42 vessels could not keep all the
coastal areas and port approaches open against a
concerted minelaying operation. The force would be
adequate to keep at least some of the principle ports
open, depending on the intensity of the minelaying
program. The MSDF also maintains one minelaying ship
and 16 patrol boats.m
In its land-based air ASW assets the JMSDF has made
the most impressive gains recently. It currently
operates 26 P-3Cs (Lockheed), 74 P-2J (Lockheed), and
13 PS-1 (Shin Meiwa), which gives the JMSDF a credible
ASW patrol capability.! i 2
,^^ri. ^}^^^®s from Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88 .Jane's Ltd, 1987, p. 302.
111. Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88 . p. 302.
112. The Military Balance 1986-87 . p. 158.
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The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) , a coast
guard force completely separate from the MSDF, operates
approximately 221 coastal patrol and rescue vessels,
including 44 large and 47 medium boats. While seven of
the large craft carry the Bell 216 search and rescue
helicopter, the lack of sonar systems and ASW weapons
render the MSA unsuitable for more then an extremely
limited role in sea lane defense.ns
The JMSDF operates a fleet of 15 diesel electric
submarines which are ideally suited for operations in
the waters surrounding Japan. The Yushio class is
considered one of the world's most advanced
conventional submarines noted for sophisticated
sonar.ii-* These submarines could be used very
effectively to defend the three straits keeping the
Soviet Pacific Fleet bottled up in the Sea of Japan.
Table III summarizes the JMSDF 's forces.
The Japanese government is improving the
capabilities of the MSDF. In addition, for the past
several years, exercises to improve the
interoperability between Japanese and American forces
have been allowed. As an exeimple, in 1986, Japanese
submarines participated for the first time in the
international RIM-PAC exercise off Hawaii.ns
To aid in the defense of the Soya strait, the JDA
plans to deploy an indigenous surface-to-surface
missile, a modification of the ASM-1, with a range of
approximately 55 miles on Hokkaido.n^ in addition, —
113. Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 322.
11*. Young, P. Lewis, "Submarines and Light Forces,"
Asian Defence Journal . December 1985, p. 59.
115. Jones, P. D. , Lt. RAN. J. V. P. Goldrick. Lt.
RAN, "Far Eastern Navies," USNI Proceedings . Vol 113, No.
3, March 1987, p. 65.
118, Young, P. Lewis, "Submarines and Light Forces,"
p. 63.
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TABL8 III: JAPAN'S NAVAL CAPABILITY
Naval Bases: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Omlnato
Naval Air Bases: Atsugi, Hachinohe, Iwakuni, Kanoya,
Komatsujlma, Naha, Ozukl, Oomlnato,
Oomura, Shlmofusa. Tateyama, Tokusnima





42 Mine Countermeasure Vessels
2 Fleet oiler
8 Small Amphibious ships
NAVAL AIR
Marine Reconnaissance/ASW
3 squadrons with 26 Lockheed P-3C
4 squadrons with 55 Lockheed P-2J
1 squadron with 13 Shin Meiwa PS-1
ASW: 6 Hel squadrons with 56 HSS-2/2A/B ( Sea King )
Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
1 hel sqn with 7 Kawasaki-Vertol 107
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
1 squadron with 4 Kawasaki -Lockheed DP-2J
On Order: 3 submarines, 9 destroyers, 2 frigates, 4
minesweepers, 10 P-3C.
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88 . 1987.
the GSDF stations two thirds of its tanks and a large
percentage of its ground forces on Hokkaido.
But the Japanese government needs to consider some
additional improvements that are relatively easy to
implement and would greatly increase the effectiveness
of the SDF. For example, mining could contribute
immensely to controlling the three straits into the Sea
of Japan. Mines are inexpensive, long-lasting, and
deny use of the sea to an enemy without risking men and
material once they are in place. Unfortunately the
MSDF does not have the number of mines and delivery
platforms required to mine the three straits. But this
would be well worth the effort and would not be
difficult.
82
The Tsugaru strait is only 20 km wide between cape
Shirakami in Hokkaido and Ryuhizaki in Aomori. No
where is the depth greater than 200 meters. This
strait could be blockaded with 1000 to 1500 magnetic,
acoustic, or pressure mines. The Soya strait is 50 km
wide and 100 meters deep. 1000 to 1500 bottom mines
would be sufficient to block this strait.n^
The Tsushima strait is both wider and deeper.
Between Tsushima and Iki is 50 km with the deepest part
at 200 meters. But from Tsushima island to Korea is
about 60 km with a water depth of up to 500 meters.
For the deep water U.S. Captor mines would have to be
used. At least 2000 to 3000 mines would be needed to
seal this strait. Thus a total of up to 6000 mines of
various kinds would be needed to mine all three
straits. It is estimated that the MSDF only has 1200
mines in stock.
The MSDF only has one minelayer. It can carry 226
mines. Other ships could carry up to 60. A P-3C can
be modified to carry 16 mines and C-130's can carry 37.
With such limited delivery platforms it would be
difficult for the MSDF to mine the straits in the face
of likely Soviet opposition.
Another significant weakness that should be within
the capability of the JDA to correct is the lack of a
joint war plsui and a common communication system for
the three services. At present, coordination in an
emergency or on joint exercises is extremely difficult.
For example, without communications, how could the ASDF
provide air cover for ships at sea? The JDA appears to
be aware of this problem and may be in the process of
solving it. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces held the
117. Information on mining the three straits is from
K. Kamiya, "Our Self-Defense Fleet and Soviet Pacific Fleet
in Emergency," Kasu . Vol. 1, 1985, pp. 130-135, trans, by
NISC.
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first unified maneuvers with all three services in
September 1986, and began to integrate their
communications system at the same time.ns
Another problem degrading the SDF's combat
capability was a restriction on using satellite
communications, which was only removed in 1985.1 i
9
In summary then, the Japanese Self Defense Forces
are technologically advanced with considerable
capabilities for anti-submarine warfare and
minesweeping. The SDF are weak in air defense over the
sea, organic air defense of their surface forces, and
minelaying. Some of these weaknesses may be minimized
with the assistance of neighboring nations. Their role
in defending Japan's sea lanes will be discussed next.
G. JAPANESE FRIENDS AND ALLIES
As part of its strategy of comprehensive security,
Japan tries to maintain friendly relations with its
neighbors. In peacetime this maximizes Japan's
opportunities for trade. In war, these ties could
provide the basis for receiving aid in defending
Japan's sea lanes. If the Soviet Union should attack
Japan's sea lanes. South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and China, because of their fear of Soviet
expansion, would probably help Japan. These four
nations are near the heavily traveled Southeast Asian
shipping lanes, and may contribute to defending Japan's
sea lanes.
The South Korean Navy has nine ex-U.S. destroyers,
6 frigates, 5 corvettes, one submarine, one
minesweeper, and 136 patrol craft. Seven of its larger
118. Young, P. Lewis, "Japan's Maritime Self Defence
Force," Navy International . Vol 92, No. 3, March 1987, p.
162.
119. Young, P. Lewis, "Japan's Maritime Self Defence
Force, " p. 162.
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vessels are equipped with the harpoon missile giving
the South Korean Navy a respectable surface-to-surface
attack capability. Unfortunately most of its ASW
equipment is obsolete and therefore ineffective for ASW
patrol or convoy defense.! 20
However, South Korea's position is tactically
significant for two reasons. Soviet aircraft attacking
Japan's southern sea lanes would have to fly within
range of radar sites in South Korea, giving an early
warning of impending attack to interceptors based in
Japan or Okinawa. The other advantage is that a
friendly cooperative South Korea would make mining or
patrolling the Tsugaru strait, which they both border,
much easier. In certain circumstances South Korea
might even participate in patrolling the strait.
Unfortunately relations between South Korea and
Japan have not always been friendly. South Korea
harbors a distrust of Japan stemming from the colonial
period. However, their relations have been improving
and some analysts are speculating that closer defensive
cooperation lies ahead. 121
Taiwan is another country whose relations with
Japan are not without some resentment. Taiwan was
upset when Japan established diplomatic relations with
China, but Japan still manages to maintain a large
trade with Taiwan. In the event of war, it is likely
that Taiwan would provide at least minimal assistamce
to Japam.
Taiwan is struggling with the problem of updating
an aging fleet, so it is not likely to be able to offer
120. Park, J. K. , "North and South Korea: A
Comparative Naval Study," Naval Forces . No. 11, December
198B, p. 36.
121. See Jack R. Carpenter, Jr., Th^ Potential of The
: ^epublic of Korea Naw for Cooperations with ^;he Japanese
Jaylilmg Seli-ygjga?^ ^?grce. In The fegcurlty g£ Uregter East
ia. Master's Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey.
Tif -.fornia, June 1985.
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any military assistance in patrolling sea lanes. Its
most modem major vessel was commissioned in 1946.
Despite this, Taiwan is updating its 23 ex-U.S.
destroyers and 10 frigates with new anti-air defenses.
However their ASW systems are obsolete and inadequate
for anti-submarine patrol. Similarly their 32 maritime
patrol aircraft are over twenty years old and of
limited capability. Taiwan recently received two new
Dutch diesel submarines, giving it a small ASW
submarine force. 122
But Taiwan's location north of the Bashi channel,
and at the end of the Rjoikyu island chain, place it
next to Japan's southwestern sea lane. Radar sites and
sonar stations on Taiwan could provide important
detection capabilities for defending Japan's sea lanes.
Basing Japanese maritime patrol aircraft on Taiwan
would give them longer time on station for patrolling
the sea lanes. At the least, the ability to divert
damaged aircraft to Taiwcuiese airfields could save
valuable pilots and aircraft.
China, on the other hand, has a relatively powerful
navy. The Chinese Navy operates 112 conventional
submarines, a nuclear powered missile submarine (SSBN),
three nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and over
seven hundred fast attack craft. Since the mid 1970 's,
Chinese shipbuilding has emphasized large ocean-going
vessels and today China possesses a capable 'blue
water' force based on sixteen destroyers and 28
frigates. For long range operations, China has built a
fleet of support vessels, including 10 supply ships and
23 tankers. 123 The destroyers and frigates protect
claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and are able
122. Jones and Goldrick, p. 67.
123. Young, P. Lewis, "Chinese Naval Developments,"
Asian Defence Journal. July 1986, p. 22.
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to 'show the flag' in distant waters. In early 1986, a
Chinese task force entered the Indian Ocean and made
port calls in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. i 24
The Chinese Navy suffers some technological
limitations that reduce its effectiveness. Inadequate
surface-to-air missiles for its surface force,
difficulties with the engineering plant aboard its
nuclear submarines, outdated weapons and sonars for
anti-submarine warfare ships, primitive electronic
systems, few mine warfare vessels, and few maritime
patrol aircraft with ASW or anti-ship capability, would
adversely affect its performance against modern Soviet
naval units.
Despite these weaknesses, China's naval power is a
regional force to be reckoned with. The submarine
force gives China a credible capability to cut sea
lanes in the East China and South China Seas--both are
well suited to diesel submarine operations. China
would be able to block Soviet, or Japanese, use of the
Malacca Straits.
There are several reasons for China to be hostile
to the Soviet Union cind friendly to Japan. Soviet
'hegemony' in Southeast Asia, particularly its support
of Vietnam, its use of bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang
and Haiphong, auid increased Soviet activity in the seas
adjacent to China, warrant Chinese concern. Also
Chinese territorial claims to the Paracel and Spratly
Islands are contested by the Soviet Union's ally,
Vietnam.125
It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would make
China and Japan allies by attacking them at the same
time. But if the Soviet Union attacked Japan, China
124. Young, "Chinese Naval Developments," p. 26.
125. Muller, David G. Jr.,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, p
_ ^_ , China as a Maritime Power .
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would want to prevent Japan's defeat, and would
probably render some assistance to Japan short of going
to war with the Soviet Union. In light of their
improving relations, China's naval assets are more
likely to benefit, than hinder, Japan.
The Philippines, like Taiwan, could provide aid in
the form of surveillance and basing rights by virtue of
its position on Japanese southern sea lames. Other
support is unlikely as the Philippine navy is in poor
material and operational shape. Foreign observers
report that of 250 ships, barely 100 are now
serviceable and only 30 regularly operate. When it
does operate, the navy is used mostly in operations
cigainst insurgents.i 26 The Philippine Navy has eight
old frigates and eleven corvettes of minimal value.
However, by providing bases to U.S. forces, the
Philippines helps Japan. U.S. forces stationed at the
Subic Bay Naval base and Clark Airforce base could
attack and destroy Soviet units based in at Cam Ranh
Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam. If these Soviet forces
were unchecked they could interdict Japanese sea lanes
through the South China Sea. Furthermore, Japan has
only expressed a willingness to protect its sea lanes
out to 1000 miles, which ends just north of the
Philippines. Japan is relying on the United States to
secure the sea lames beyond that limit, and without
bases in the Philippines, the U.S. Seventh Fleet
probably could not accomplish that mission.
Thus Japan's neighbors, while probably not
providing direct assistance in defending Japan's sea
lanes, could considerably ease Japanese operations, and
might provide additional surveillance and early warning
capabilities. This assistance, when added to Japan's
security arrangements with the United States, must be
128. Jones and Goldrick, p. 68
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considered in devising a strategy for sea lane defense.
The Japanese military strategy as reflected in the
disposition of Japanese forces and their cooperation
with the United States are discussed next.
D. JAPANESE MILITARY STRATEGY
The impact of the government's commitment to defend
the sea lanes out to 1000 miles is not yet fully
apparent in the disposition of Japanese forces,
reflecting the lack of a consensus on strategy. But it
has prompted the SDF to expand the operating areas of
their armed forces , to show more awareness of strait
defense missions and sea control, and begin to engage
in joint exercises with U.S. military forces. The
division of responsibilities between the two nations
and the U.S. perception of how Japan fits into the U.S.
Maritime Strategy reflect Japan's growing role in
defense.
All Japanese forces are defensively deployed on
Japanese territory or in the surrounding sea. Hokkaido
(the northern most of the Japanese main islands) is
heavily protected. At present the GSDF have 50,000
troops, (about one third of the total) 730 tanks, and
plan to station their new surface-to-surface missile
(SSM-1) there. American F-16's were stationed at
Misawa in 1985 to provide additional air coverage for
Hokkaido. But the ASDF continues to deploy most of its
interceptors in positions to defend the main islands of
Honshu, Kyushu, Shokoku, relegating sea lane defense to
a secondary role. Half the JMSDF's forces, including
their most capable destroyers, are assigned to four
escort squadrons and the other half are assigned among
the ten regional escort devisions.
But recently the Japanese government has allowed
SDF units to expand their operations. Several MSDF
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units have taken "world tours" to North and South
America. In June 1984 a destroyer and training ship
made an overseas trip which called on eight countries,
visited fourteen foreign ports and travelled 32,000
nautical miles, stopping in the United States, Canada,
Pan£una, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay and
Argentina.! 27
The Japanese reliance on U.S. military assistance
has been noted. Specifically the Japanese see the U.S.
defending the sea lanes beyond 1000 miles by achieving
naval superiority over the Soviets and destroying
Soviet submarines. Within 1000 miles the Japanese see
themselves carrying out defensive missions such as
minesweeping, strait defense, defensive minelaying,
escorting convoys, maritime air patrol, surveillance,
and air defense. The Japanese have always relied on
the United States to carry out offensive missions, such
as attacking Soviet naval and air bases and sending
nuclear attack submarines into Soviet waters to attack
submarines and ships. In addition the Japanese expect
assistance from U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in
Japan to help achieve air superiority over Japan.
The Japanese offer to defend the sea lanes out to
1000 miles also brought about a marked increase in
military cooperation between the armed forces of the
two countries.
As has already been noted, under treaty arrangements,
the Japanese allow the stationing of U.S. troops in
Japan and the use of Japanese bases. Furthermore, the
Japanese pay for the U.S. forces. The cost to Japan in
1982 was US$1.05 billion. Japan pays US$21,000 per US
127
. Mcintosh, p. 48.
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soldier per year, compared to a West German
contribution of US $5,666,128
The Japanese government also cooperate with the
U.S. Navy by allowing nuclear powered and nuclear
equipped ships use Japanese ports. The visit of an
American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson,
to Japan in December 1984, highlighted the willingness
of the Japanese government to allow the United States
to ignore the Japanese non-nuclear policy. The fact
that American warships entering Japanese territorial
waters and ports carry nuclear weapons is widely
recognized in Japan.
In recent years cooperation between the two
governments has resulted in joint military operations.
By 1982, in a break with policy prior to 1980, the
Japanese had participated in several RIMPAC exercises
(joint U.S. -allied naval exercises) .1 29 Since then
Japanese naval units annually take part in RIMPAC and
FLEETEX Pacific Ocean exercises. In April 1983,
Japanese GSDF troops took part in exercises at Fort
Ord, California. In September 1985 the first joint
U.S. -Japan command post exercise was held involving
ninety ships, 125 aircraft and 22,000 Japanese
personnel. During this exercise American marines and
Japanese troops staged an sunphibious assault on
Hokkaido.
The American military is heartened by this
increased military cooperation and see Japan's
participation as vital to the United States in the
event of war in the Pacific. In particular the U.S.
Navy depends on Japanese cooperation to carry out it's
128, In comparison the US agreed to pay the
?pines $900 millionark Airforce Base.
Philip over five years to use Subic Bay
'
-if * • "
129. Leherack, Otto, III. Lt. Col., USMC (Ret.),
"Search for a New Consensus", Proceedings . March 1984, p. 98
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Pacific Maritime Strategy, and sees Japanese sea lane
vulnerability as an opening the Soviets could use to
destroy the U.S. -Japan alliance. 130 Without the use of
Japanese bases and cooperation of the Japanese
government, the U.S. Maritime Strategy would fail in
the Pacific. 131
The U.S. Maritime Strategy calls for three carrier
battle groups, one battleship surface action group,
three underway replenishment groups, and an undisclosed
number of submarines to deploy to the Northwest Pacific
to strike Soviet forces and territory. This "forward
defense" will established U.S. control of the Pacific
by destroying Soviet bases, aircraft, submarines and
ships, or bottling them up in Soviet waters. This
strategy risks the U.S. aircraft carriers to attack by
Soviet aircraft and submarines. It relies on Japcui to
protect its territorial land, sea, and air space,
providing a screen for U.S. naval forces, and on
Japanese bases to sustain American forces at sea. i 32
From the Japaoiese perspective there are several
weaknesses to the U.S. strategy. Japan is dependent on
the U.S. for defense, but the U.S. is formally
committed to come to Japan's aid only if its territory
is attacked, not its sea lanes. Another weakness is
that Japan assumes that the U.S. will protect the sea
lanes beyond 1000 miles, but the American Maritime
Strategy provides no escorts for sea lane defense.
Finally, the Japanese are concerned that in the event
130. Rothchild, Randall L. , LCDR, USN. "Japan's Oil
Dependence--Implications to U.S. Maritime Strategy."
unpublished paper submitted to the U.S. Naval War College,
3 March 1986, p. 7.
131. Begbie, A. J., CDR, USN, "Japan's Influence on
the U.S. Maritime Strategy," an unpublished paper submitt^
to the U.S. Naval War College, 15 May 1987, pp. 14-20.
132. Cotton, Lawrence S. . Jr., LCDR, USN, "Potential
Japanese Support of U.S. Maritime Strategy," an unpublished
>er submitted to the U.S. Naval War College, 18 February
17, pp. 5-19.
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of global war, U.S. commitments to NATO may be given
priority, drawing American forces away from the Pacific
and leaving Japan inadequately defended.
Japan's continued over-reliance on U.S. forces for
defense, is the result of the lack of consensus on a
unified military strategy for Japan, rather than on an
objective appraisal of the situation. While Japan
should continue to cooperate with the U.S. and can rely
on the U.S. -Japan security treaty for some protection,
it must develop a more independent strategy for sea
lane defense. Relying on U.S. power projection, this
strategy should concentrate on defending Japan's sea
lanes through closer cooperation with neighbors and the
selected build up of the SDF. The factors that should
be considered in sea lane defense and the current
threat are discussed in the next chapter.
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V. ggA LAMB DRFgHfig: CHALLZtiggg AMD IMPgRATIVgfi
Certain factors, such as the Soviet ability to
interdict sea lanes with attack aircraft and
submarines, the Soviet appreciation of mine warfare,
and the effectiveness of convoys for protecting
merchant ships, are habitually overlooked or
underemphasized in the study of Japanese sea lane
defense. This chapter will review the experiences of
sea lane defense in World War II, some proposals for
defending Japan's sea lanes, Soviet capabilities for
interdicting Japan's sea lanes, and factors that must
be considered in defending sea lanes. Finally several
ways that Japan can improve the defense of its sea
lanes will be suggested.
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES
This thesis has argued that the Japanese government
has only recently begun to seriously consider defending
its sea lanes. In developing a strategy for sea lane
defense, the Japanese should carefully consider lessons
of the past.
World War II taught two lessons concerning sea
lanes: mines are extremely effective, and convoys are
the best method to protect merchant ships against sea
lane interdiction. Technological advances have
enhanced, not diminished, these two lessons and their
importance to sea lane defense.
Mines are the most cost-effective form of naval
warfare. In an article, Naw International recounts
the advantages of mines
.
Mines are small, easily concealed, cheap to
acquire, require virtually no maintenance, have
a long shelf like, are easy to store in
considerable numbers, and can be laid easily
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and simply from almost any type of
platform. . .133
While relatively easy to sow, they can deny use of the
sea to greatly superior naval forces, and require an
effort out of all proportion to their size to
neutralize them.
During World War II, mines were widely and
effectively used by both sides. Germany laid well over
100,000 mines, sinking 650 ships, while the Allies
sowed some 250,000 mines sinking 1000 ships. Some
analysts calculate that one out of every 40 mines laid
in World War II proved effective. i 3*
The American mining campaign against Japan is
particularly impressive. 25,000 mines sank or damaged
1075 ships, equal to over two million tons of Japanese
shipping.! 35 These mines were laid with the loss of
only 15 aircraft. In comparison, U.S. submarines
produced 4.8 million tons of Japanese shipping
casualties at cost of 40 submarines and 3,000 lives
lost. 138 Even more impressive is the success of the
inner zone mining campaign in the final six months of
the war. This campaign alone almost completely stopped
Japanese shipping and caused 63 percent of sll. Japanese
merchant ship casualties during that period. i 3?
Countermeasures against mines in World War II
required a tremendous effort. By 1944 the Allies
deployed some 1,500 mine countermeasure vessels and
No. 2, Februa^lteffpTlot1,
"Mines and Mining," Vol. 91,
134. Naw International . "Mines and Mining," p. 106.
135. For a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of
the American mining campaign see Ellis A. Johnson and David
A {Catcher's. Mines Against J^pan. Naval Ordnance
Laboratory, Government Printing Office, 1973.
136. Hoffman, Roy E. , RADM, USN, "Offensive Mine
Warfare: A Forgotten Strategy?," USNI Proceedings . Vol.
103, May 1977, p. 150.
137. Johnson and Katcher, p. 29.
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300,000 men to clear mines. The Japanese effort to
clear mines from World War II lasted until 1970.
Several more recent uses of mines attest to their
continuing effectiveness. In the Korean War a force of
North Korean sampans and Junks mined the port of Wonsan
with a field of 3,500 moored contact and ground
influence mines, delaying the landing of a U.N.
amphibious force for eight days. The U.S. Commander,
Rear Admiral A. E. Smith observed, "We have lost
control of the sea to a nation without a Navy, using
obsolete weapons, delivered by ships which were in use
at the time of Christ, "i 3 8 in auaother instance, the
U.S. sealed the harbor of Haiphong in 1972, forcing the
Vietnamese to abandon the harbor. It took U.S.
minesweepers 63 days to clear the harbor after the war.
More recently, the Red Sea mining incident in 1984
required a force of 34 mine sweepers and support ships
with 3000 men 60 days to clear the shipping lanes.
The Soviet Union and the U.S. have spent
considerable effort to develop advanced mines,
including some that are contain acoustically homing
torpedoes . Both superpowers have mines they can employ
in water up to 2000 meters deep, and the Soviets may be
able to mine as deep as 3000 meters. i 39
Another lesson from World War II that still
pertains today, is that an interdiction csunpaign waged
by submarines is most effectively countered by
convoying merchant ships. World War II presents a
very interesting study of submarine campaigns against
merchant shipping because two campaigns were waged with
opposite results. Retired Captain Roland Bowling
complied an extensive study of these two ccimpaigns and
concluded that the German campaign against allied
138. Navy International . "Mines and Mining," p. 107
139. Navy International . "Mines and Mining," p. 110
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shipping was defeated by the convoy system and a
vigorous anti-submarine program. On the other hand,
the Japanese merchant marine was almost completely
destroyed by Allied mining and submarine campaigns, and
a significant cause of this defeat was the fact that
the Japanese did not institute a convoy system until it
was too late. 1^0 Bowling finds that in convoys across
the North Atlantic only 0.7 percent (seven-tenths of
one percent) of ships sailing in convoys were sunk. Of
all the ships sunk in World War II, 72 percent were
steiuning independently and only 28 percent were in
convoys, and some counted in the latter catagory were
convoy stragglers. Even convoys with few escorts were
much safer than ships sailing independently. However,
as the number of escorts per convoy increased, the
number of attacking submarines that were sunk increased
dramatically. Bowling also found that increasing the
number of ships in the convoy, and thus decreasing the
frequency of the convoys, did not appreciably affect
the percentage of merchant ships sunk.i^i
Another study conducted by the Atlantic Council of
the United States resulted in conclusions similar to
Captain Bowling's findings. This study, published as
Securing the Seas . stressed the concept that sea lane
defense is a "war of attrition." The attacking
submarines must sink enough merchants ships to cripple
the opponent's war effort, before the enemy's anti-
submarine warfare forces destroy all the attacking
submarines. Securing the Seas studied the ratios of
merchant vessels sunk compared to submarines destroyed
140. Japan began the war with 6,000.000 tons of
merchant shipping and ended with a mere 312.000 tons. Of
this 56 percent was sunk by American submarines. Bowling,
Roland Alfred. Capt. , USN, (Ret.), The Negative Influence
of M^han of the Protection of Shipping in wartime . fh.D.
thesis submitted to the University of Maine at Urono , May
1980, p. 451.
141. Bowling, pp. 473-486.
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and found that when the U-boat campaign was directed
against ships sailing independently the exchange rate
was 12.8:1. (12.8 merchants sunk for every submarine
lost. ) But when the U-boat campaign first shifted to
attacking convoys, the exchange rate fell to 2.6:1. By
the end of the war the exchange rate against convoys
fell further to 0.6 merchant ships sunk for every U-
boat lost. Furthermore, using analytical models based
on World War II data and adjusted for improved
technology, the study tested two other variables: the
effects of having more ASW forces at the beginning of
the war; and the effects of deploying all the
submarines before beginning the interdiction campaign.
The conclusions were significant. Having a larger
number of ASW forces at the beginning of the campaign
did not enable the ASW forces to protect the merchant
vessels much better. However they were able to sink
the attacking submarines at a faster rate, reducing the
number of submarine attacks, which resulted in fewer
merchant ships sunk over the first 90 days. For the
other variable, the study found that predeploying the
attacking submarines was a better strategy for the
attacker. None of the submarines would be lost in
chokepoints or ASW barriers while deploying, resulting
in a larger initial submarine force. The larger
surviving submarine force then sank a larger number of
merchfioit vessels. However, the submarines did not
escape the inevitable outcome. Because the merchant
ships so outnumber the submarines, even a relatively
small rate of attrition will mean that the submarines
will be destroyed before being able to destroy a
significant portion of the merchant fleet, if the
submarines are opposed by ASW forces. 142
142. Nitze, Paul H. , and others, Securing the Seas .
Westview Press, 1979, pp. 337-382.
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other analysts come up with similar findings.
Commander E. Cameron Williams studied convoying through
history and found certain patterns or "laws" persist.
At the outbreak of war:
1. Shipowners always resist convoying.
2. Naval authorities, too, resist convoying,
although for different reasons.
3. Merchant ship losses, once the enemy mounts an
attack on shipping, are unacceptably high.
4. Convoying has always proved to be the only
workable solution.! *3
Williams finds that by the end of 1939, the Royal Navy
had escorted 5,756 merchants in convoy, losing 12. In
the same period 102 independent merchants were sunk.
Most significantly, more submarines were lost attacking
convoys than in attacking independents . i * *
Not all naval experts agree with convoying.
Captain S. D. Landersman, feels that technological
advances in submarines may maike them more efficient.
The high-speed nuclear attack submarine with unlimited
submerged endurance, antiship missiles, and long-range
homing torpedoes, supported by a complex ocean
surveillance system, and the threat from land-based
aircraft, may make convoys less effective. He feels
that today's faster larger merchant ships, modern anti-
submarine weapons, and surveillance systems make a
"protected lane" strategy more feasible. In this
strategy ASW forces patrol a shipping route, searching
for and destroying submarines, while merchants sail
individually at their best speed.i*5
Commander William Mellin disagrees. Mellin points
out that the success of convoying in World War II
resulted from the principle of concentration of force
143. Williams, E. Cameron, CDR, USNR, "The Four 'Iron
Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War
College Review . Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, May-June 1986, p. 3b.
I**. Williams, p. 40.
145. Landersman, S.D., CAPT, USN, (Ret.), "Naval
Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War Col lege
Review . Vol. XXXIXT No. 2, March-April l98b, p. 26-3i:
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not technological advantages. The hunter-killer groups
deplo7ed against the submarines had the same equipment
as convoy escorts and were specifically tasked to
destroy submarines, yet 65 percent of the German U-
boats were sunk by convoy escorts and only 27 percent
by the ASW groups. The reason is simple. The hunter-
killer groups had a higher kill probability—if they
made contact. The submarines had to challenge the
convoy escorts to attack the convoy and consequently
the escorts had many more contacts—and kills.
Mellin also points out that the high speed advantage of
nuclear submarines (SSN's) is of less tactical
usefulness than is typically assumed. While SSN's are
running at high speeds they drastically reduce the
effectiveness of their sonars. They are essentially
running blind. Mellin examines three possible tactics.
With a speed of advance of 25 knots, the SSN
could conceivably run at 25 knots, sprint at 27
knots and listen for one half hour ax 10 knots,
or sprint four hours at 29 knots and listen one
hour at 10 knots. In the first instance, the
submarine is noise limited 100% of the time, in
the second 88%, and in the third 80%. In
effect, the SSN becomes no more that a noisy,
high-speed transitting submarine with a secure
detection capability against a barrier
submarine estimated to be less than .01, a very
high probability of being killed, and a weapon
system vulnerability of about .99.1*6
This indicates that a submarine stalking a convoy is
still speed limited when setting up its attack
approach, especially if the convoy is employing zig-zag
tactics and randomly changing course. Mellin also
cites a U.S. Navy study completed in 1974, Project Sea
Express , that concluded that no independent shipping
method was as effective as convoying to support his
contention that convoying is still effective against
modern submarines.
148. Mellin, William F.. "To Convoy or Not to
Convoy," USNI Proceedings. Vol. 103, No. 3, March 1980, p,
52.
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Mellin's arguments are sound. But it seems that
those who argue that technological advances have
improved the performance of submarines more than that
of anti-submarine warfare, making submarines more
efficient sinkers of merchant vessels, are missing the
point. Shipping interdiction campaigns are "wars of
attrition" pitting submarines against merchants and ASW
forces against submarines. Since there are so many-
more merchant ships than submarines, even a low
attrition rate against the submarines will result in
the destruction of the submarine force before a
decisive number of merchants are sunk.
Mellin also analyses two alternate convoy
strategies: "continuous shipping" and "pulsed
shipping." In continuous shipping, smaller convoys
steam more frequently. In pulsed shipping very large
convoys are sent at infrequent intervals, overwhelming
the attacking forces. Although pulsed shipping could
reduce ship losses substantially, it has several
drawbacks. Pulsed shipping requires a larger number of
ships and forces them to wait for extended periods
until the next convoy sailing. More importantly, large
convoys create problems such as port congestion,
loading and delivery rates, warehouse capacity, and
commauad and control. Pulsed convoys also make attacks
on port facilities a more efficient, and more
attractive, alternative to sea lane interdiction.
These disadvantages make smaller, more frequent convoys
a better strategy . ^ *
7
The lessons of World War II indicate that the
offensive and defensive use of mines is one of the most
effective forms of naval war, and that Japanese waters
are particulary susceptible to mining. The other
lesson is that convoying is still likely to be the most
147
. Mellin, p. 53.
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effective counter to a sea lane interdiction threat,
despite modem advances in submarines and anti-
submarine warfare.
Although the Japanese government has not officially
adopted a strategy for sea lane defense, several
proposals for Japanese sea lane defense have been
offered. Three alternative proposals will be examined,
the Sekino Plan, the Schilling Plan, and the Taoka
Plan.
Commander Hideo Sekino, a retired officer of the
Imperial Japanese Navy, proposed a plan to defend
Japan's sea lanes in 1971. In Sekino 's plan the GSDF
would have primary responsibility for the defense of
Hokkaido, for which he feels they have sufficient
force. 1^8 The ASDF has primary responsibility for
establishing air superiority over Japan and the
surrounding seas. The MSDF must protect Japan from
invasion and protect the sea lanes, a task for which
they need more forces.
Sekino feels that the Soviet Union threatens Japan.
He observes that there are three possible Soviet
attacks on Japan, nuclear attack, invasion, or the
destruction of shipping. The first two attacks
obligate the United States to come to Japan's aid under
the U.S. -Japan security treaty. But a Soviet attack on
Japanese merchants on the high seas does not.
Sekino says the major threat to Japan's sea lanes
is from the Soviet Pacific Fleet, particularly its
submarines, and to a lessor extent long-range bombers.
Sekino notes that mining is also very effective in
Japan's waters. In view of Japan's dependence on the
sea lanes, and the prospect that Japan might have to
1^8. The analysis of Sekino 's plan is based on a
description he published in his article "Japan and Her
Maritime Defenses," USNI Proceedings . Vol. 97, No. 5, May
1971, pp. 100-21.
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defend them alone, Sekino argues that protection of sea
communications should be given highest priority in the
national defense of Japan.
To make the defending Japan's sea lanes more
manageable, Sekino would cut ocean-going shipping to
less than half its peacetime level. Coastal shipping
would be diverted to land routes as much as possible.
And Japanese shipping would operate only in the area
north of Indonesia, between Japan and Australia, and
between Japan and the United States.
At the heart of Sekino 's Plan is a proposal to use
the two great island chains to the south of Japan to
form a protected "Maritime Safety Zone" which would
make the defense of shipping possible even against a
powerful submarine force. The eastern island chain
runs from the Izu Islands, south of Tokyo Bay, to the
Ogasawaras (Bonin Islands), Iwo Jima, and the Marianas
(and Guam). The western chain runs from Kyushu to the
Okinawas (Nansei Islands), Taiwan, the Philippines and
then to Borneo. (See Figure 3 for a map of this area.
)
Sonar stations and bases for ASW planes and helicopters
would be established on some of these islands. These
bases, operating in cooperation with hunter-killer
groups in the zone, would steadily find and destroy
enemy submarines. To destroy attacking aircraft, some
of the island bases would operate air search radars
and VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) fighters.
Sekino points out that the three straits leading
into the Sea of Japan could be mined to prevent the
passage of Soviet submarines and surface ships, but
notes that Japan has a small mine-laying capability.
This could be augmented by converting some small
merchant vessels to minelayers in a war.
Sekino estimated his plan would require 15








Figure 3: Seklno's Marltioie Safety Zone
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submarines), 3 small aircraft carriers (20,000 tons),
and 96 destroyers for anti-submarine operations. An
additional 32 destroyers and frigates, and 92 patrol
craft were required for coastal defense. The mine
warfare force would have 64 ships. Finally, 200 land-
based fixed-wing patrol aircraft, 24 flying boats, and
348 helicopters, or 570 total aircraft, would provide
the air ASW assets.
In Sekino's plan the enemy submarines would suffer
attrition from mines and coastal patrols as they passed
through the straits, from island based patrols as they
passed the island chain barrier, and finally from the
hunter-killer groups as they operated in the zone.
Sekino would only provide direct convoy escorts for
important cargoes, or in certain zones.
Sekino's plan has much to recommend it, but has
several weaknesses. The Soviet air threat, which was
not as capable at the time he conceived his plan, has
grown. He overestimates the effectiveness of VTOL
aircraft which have limited range, endurance, and
weapons carrying ability. Secondly, his plan rests on
the effectiveness of area ASW, the attrition of the
attacking submarines by hunter-killer groups, more than
on actually escorting and defending the convoys.
Therefore, it supposes that enough resources are
stockpiled in Japan to sustain the economy for the
simount of time it will take to destroy the attacking
submarines. Finally, his plan, by including aircraft
carriers, even small ones, would be hard to implement
politically, since Japan's possession of "offensively
capable " aircraft carriers is highly controversial.
An American analyst, David Shilling, suggested a
plan which would enable Japan to provide a large part
of its sea lane defense needs without a large military
that would provoke domestic and international
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opposition. By taking economic measures to reduce
their dependence on imports during a crisis, and by-
using non-provocative military measures, Japan could
reduce the threat of sea lane interdiction. lo
Shilling agrees with Sekino that naval defense
should be a high priority because interruption of
shipping is the most serious conventional threat to
Japan and where its capabilities are the weakest. He
also sees the large number of Soviet submarines as
Japan's biggest threat. Shilling feels that two
obstacles prevent Japan from acting on this need. The
Japanese tendency to concentrate on the constitutional
and political constraints which limit the size of the
military, and the widespread feeling that sea lane
defense is impossible. Shilling proposes that Japan
counteract its dependence on sea lanes within its
political constraints. Shilling's proposal has three
parts: Japaai must cut its import requirements in war;
minimize the vulnerability of its remaining required
imports; and neutralize the submarine threat with non-
provocative military measures.
Shilling argues convincingly that, in a war of
attrition between merchant ships and submarines, it is
necessary for the country being attacked to be able to
hold out for several months while its ASW forces
destroy the submarines. The submarines suffer
cumulative attrition as they move through barrier,
area, and convoy ASW defenses.
Approximately 1,850 ships visit Japanese ports each
month, delivering an annual cargo of some 600 million
tons. This huge volume of Japanese peacetime merchant
shipping would be impossible to protect during wartime
without maintaining a large standing escort fleet and
1^9. The description of Shilling's plan comes from
his article "A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense
Needs," Asian Survey . Vol. 16, No. 3, March 1976.
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alarming other Asian nations. In wartime, the volume
of imports could be cut by a reduction in personal
consumption and suspending of all export production.
Shilling calculates the amount of imports that could be
cut by determining the amount of imports that the
Japanese economy is using to produce its exports. The
remaining imports are consumed by the populace.
Shilling concludes that Japan's imports could be cut by
over 71 percent. The remaining imports could be
delivered in approximately 400 ship arrivals per month.
Furthermore, if the Japanese government instituted
rationing and war taxes, import requirements could be
to only 250 ship arrivals per month. This level
constitutes the "austere import requirements."
Instead of cutting personal consumption, the
Japanese government could stockpile needed resources.
For example, oil accounts for over 75 percent of
austere import requirements. If the Japanese
government stockpiled a 70 days peacetime supply, and
then used it at a lower rate by cutting out export
production, this would reduce wartime import
requirements to 280 ship arrivals per month for five
months until the stockpile ran out. (It should be
noted that this is accomplished without the cut in
personal consumption mentioned earlier.
)
Shilling holds that Japan can take the measures to
protect its minimum required ships. They should be
routed on sea lanes as far away from the submarine
threat, forcing the submarines to make the longest
possible transits. Against Soviet submarines, these
routes would be directly to the south of Japan between
the Philippines and Guam. Oil tankers coming from the
Persian Gulf should avoid the Strait of Malacca, using
either the Torres Strait or going all the way around
Australia.
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To protect shipping, Shilling estimates that with a
force of 45 destroyers, the MSDF could escort four
convoys from distances of 4000 nautical miles (figuring
12 days at 15 knots per hour and three days inport at
either end) . This would protect convoys from as far
away as Indonesia. By Imposing austere economic
measures and stockpiling, Shilling estimates that Japan
could get by on the four or five 60 ship convoys a
month the MSDF could convoy.
Shilling believes that these measures would limit
Japanese shipping losses to the absolute minimum,
leaving the MSDF the job of destroying the attacking
submarine force. To accomplish this, the MSDF should
build and stockpile enough mines to close the three
straits. Additional barriers of moored magnetic and
U.S. Captor mines could be laid in gaps between
islands, such as between the Ryukyu Islands from Kyushu
to Taiwan. Patrol aircraft would be able to cover the
ocean between Japan and the Philippines (Sekino's
Maritime Safety Zone) from bases in Japan, Okinawa, and
Iwo Jima, adding to the attrition rate.
Shilling acknowledges that Soviet submarines
operating out of the base at Petropavlovsk would
present the most difficult problem since there are no
geographical choke points. He suggests that anti-
submarine patrol aircraft using sonobuoys might have
some success against them.
Shilling's plan depends on the Japanese being able
to drastically cut consumption and to stockpile enough
supplies to be able to hold out for up to six months
while the MSDF's limited ASW forces destroy the
attacking submarines through attrition.
Shilling' s estimates of the amount of imports that
the Japanese could safely cut from their economy is
optimistic to say the least. His austere requirements
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represent only 29 percent of peacetime imports. It is
doubtful if a resource poor nation like Japan, could
sustain such a shock the loss of these imports would
mean to its economy. Secondly, these import reductions
would be coming during a war when Jap^al would need
imports of resource like coal and iron (which Shilling
cuts by 87 percent) to build munitions to defend
itself. The increased operational tempo of Japan's
armed forces would consume much of the oil saved by
ending export production. Lastly, it is likely that
such a massive SLOG interdiction campaign against Japan
would come during a global war, when allies would need
Japan's productive capacity. If the campaign were only
directed against Japan, then the United States would
undoubtedly assist its most valued Pacific ally.
Shilling is right to propose a plan which considers
the political views of the Japanese themselves, but
then he proposes that Japan escort convoys from 2,100
and 4,000 nautical miles away. The Japanese government
decision to protect its sea lames out to 1000 miles was
a controversial decision. There is no indication yet
that they would go further.
Shilling's concern over the submarine base at
Petropavlovsk is well warranted as it is principally a
submarine base. Although most of the diesel submarines
operate out of Vladivostok, they could easily be
transferred in a war. Petropavlovsk has unobstructed
access to the Pacific, which is clearly an important
consideration for a submarine operations. However, the
fact that more of the diesel submarines are not
stationed there already is suggestive. The reason may
have to do with logistics. Petropavlovsk has no land
route capable of handling freight. Virtually all
supplies are brought in by sea, but the northern sea
route is only open for a small part of the year. The
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small, but capable, Japanese force of dlesel submarines
could give the Soviets a sea lane interdiction problem
of their own, if the base had to be supplied from
Vladivostok.
The largest oversight in Shilling's plan, is that
he completely overlooks the air threat. This is
probably because he felt that a submarine interdiction
campaign was more serious. With additional Soviet
Backfire bombers stationed in East Asia and improved
air launched anti-ship missiles, that may no longer be
true.
Another proposal to defend Japanese was advanced by
Shunji Taoka, a military analyst for the Asahi Shimbun .
Taoka suggested building a force of 1,500 helicopters
to be stationed on the merchant vessels themselves.
Taoka estimated that such a force could protect one 50
ship convoy per day between Tokyo and San Francisco,
supplying one million tons of imports daily, for less
than it would cost to support a force of destroyers
large enough to accomplish the task. i so
A similar idea has been proposed in the United
States. Named the "Arapaho" project, it calls for
placing modern ASW helicopters on large fast container
ships. On these ships, certain containers would be
replaced with containers converted into berthing
compartments, maintenance workshops, washrooms, fuel
and water tanks, and storerooms. The system would be
sturdy and dependable, and except for the helicopter,
able to sit idly in a container for ten or twenty
years, getting minimal upkeep, and a few isolated
exercises along the way. i si
150. Auer, p. 165.
151. The information on the Arapaho project is from
Gerald G. O'Rourke's "A Good New Idea." U.S. Nava l
Institute Proceedings . Vol. 103, No. 3, HarcHlFQO.
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Captain Gerald O'Rourke contends that commercial
helicopters can be adapted for Arapaho in time of war,
and flown by Naval Reserve pilots. This would keep
expenses low. The Arapaho helicopters need not be as
fully capable as military helicopters, but could play a
supporting role, such as carrying additional torpedoes.
There are three drawbacks to this system.
Proponents of Arapaho typically underestimate the
support requirements for operating aircraft. It is one
thing for a merchant to have a helicopter landing pad
to transfer personnel or light freight. It is quite
another to be able to fuel, arm, and maintain a
helicopter for weeks or months at a time. Secondly,
what about operations? A typical take off and landing
on a small aviation capable surface escort requires
twenty-six members of ships company in addition to the
aviation detail of about twenty. This is about twice
the manning of some merchaaits. Thirdly, most merchants
do not carry the required special equipment. Torpedoes
need to be stored in a magazine and require expert
maintenance and handling. Night operations require
special lights, communications equipment, sophisticated
radar, navigational aids and other equipment not
normally found on merchant ships. A related problem is
that one helicopter operating alone is not very
effective against a modern submarine. Good anti-
submarine warfare requires coordination with other
units that only comes with intensive training. The
Arapaho project may look good on paper, but is not
likely to provide much help in protecting sea lanes.
A more recent variation of this proposal is the
development of a crane system that enables small
warships to operate VTOL aircraft such as the Harrier.
Termed "Skyhook, " this system would allow frigates as
small as 4,000 tons to operate high performance jet
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aircraft. The Harrier hovers alongside and is captured
by a ship-mounted crane which can then place it
precisely in position on the deck. i 52
Promoters claim Skyhook gives small ships a
tremendous increase in potential anti-air warfare,
surveillance, and anti-ship capability. Ships slightly
larger than the typical ASW frigate could carry two or
three Harriers and provide at least minimal air
coverage for an entire convoy.
The Japanese MSDF has expressed an interest in
Skyhook as an alternative to building conventional
aircraft carriers. According to Jane's Defence Weekly .
British Aerospace and Dowty, the developers of Skyhook,
have been talking to Japanese industry officials and
"the MSDF could become the first operator of the
Skyhook system. "i 5 3
This would be a mistake. While small warships
could support the operations of Harrier aircraft,
unlike the merchant ships in the Arapaho project, the
Harrier is limited in range, endurance and weapons load
as an interceptor against high performance attack
aircraft. The Japanese MSDF operates for the most part
within range of land based air support. Rather than
spend money on a new system that would added a few
limited capability aircraft to their inventory, the
Japanese would do much better buying more land based F-
15' s, or tanker aircraft that would increase the combat
range of existing land based fighters.
World War II teaches two lessons: mine warfare is
very effective, and that the convoy system will defeat
a sea lane interdiction campaign. Having examined
152. Fozard. John. Heinz Frick, and Denis J. Mottram,
"Skyhook: Tactical Air for Smaller Ships," USNI
Prgcegdinffs. Vol. 112, No. ii, p. 61.
153. Cook, Nick, "JMSDF May Become First Operator of
UK' s^ Skyhook," Jane's Defense W^eeklv . Vol. 8, No. 14, 10
October 1987, p. 784.
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several proposals for sea lane defense, this paper will
discuss the Soviet threat to Japan's sea lanes.
B. THE SOVIET THREAT TO JAPANESE SEA LANES
The Soviet Union's presence in East Asia is
menacing- -and growing. It deploys 40 divisions,
370,000 troops, east of Lake Baikal. Also assigned to
this region is a quarter of the Soviet Air Force—about
460 bombers, 1,610 tactical fighters, and 150 patrol
planes. Over a quarter of the Soviet Navy is based in
this theater with about 82 major surface combatants,
109 submarines, two Kiev-class aircraft carriers, the
Minsk and the Novorossiysk, Kara-class missile
cruisers, and Krivak-class missile destroyers. One-
third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal is deployed in the
region, including SS-18s and SS-N-18s and 135 SS-20s.
Of particular concern to the Japanese is the deployment
of a Soviet division on the disputed northern
territories of Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan, and
the building of a new submarine base at Simushir.i54
The Soviet Union poses the greatest military threat
to Japan. The Soviet Union has at least 135 SS-20
missiles and 80 Backfire bombers in East Asia. The
Soviet Pacific Fleet, the largest of the Soviet fleets,
has bases close to Japan at Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk,
Sovetskaya Gavan, Korsakov, and Aleksandrovsk. The
fleet is split between two base complexes at
Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. Most nuclear submarines
are based at Petropavlovsk, while diesel submarines and
most surface forces are homeported in Vladivostok.
Naval aircraft are based at Sovetskaya Gavan.
In addition the Soviet bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da
154, Defense of Japan. 1984 . Tokyo: The Japan Times,
1984, pp. 30-35.
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Nang threaten shipping in Malacca Straits and could
curtail Japan's oil supplies.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet has been the fastest
growing fleet. Especially significant is the increase
in naval aviation, amphibious forces, and surface
combatants. Particularly ominous for sea lane defense
is the large number of submarines and naval attack
aircraft stationed in the Pacific.
The growth of Soviet Naval Aviation has led one
commentator to say that "the SNA is the most powerful
component of the Soviet Pacific-based forces for
fighting a conventional war in the Pacific. "i 55
Backfires, Bears, and Badgers project power far into
the Pacific. Armed with the AS-4 cruise missile, the
Backfire has an unrefueled combat radius of 3000 nm and
can attack ships from 250 miles away. 1 58 The Bear C/G,
armed with the AS- 3 has a combat range of over 4000 nm.
The Badger carries either the AS-5 with a 100 mile
range or the AS-6 with about a 200 nm range, and has a
combat range of 2000 nm.is? Soviet Naval Aviation now
has from 130 to 160 long-range bombers in East Asia.
In addition, the Soviets currently have 16 Badger and 4
Bear aircraft permanently based at the Cam Ranh Bay
complex. 1 5 8
The major wartime mission of the SNA is to destroy
enemy ships, in particular US carrier task forces, and
ballistic missile submarines . i 5 9 Sergei Gorshkov,
155. Jacobs, G. "Soviet Pacific-based Strike Forces"
Asian P^f^ng^ JovArnal. January 1986, p. 12.
^
^,156 UndgratandiBg Soyi^t Nayal Dgvel9Pmgnt.g , Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy,
Washington, D.C., April 1985, p. 30.
157. Jacobs, G. , "Soviet Naval Aviation in the
Pacific," Navy International . Vol. 92, No. 6, June 1987,
p. 346.
158. Jacobs, "Soviet Naval Aviation," p. 344.
159. Jacobs, "Soviet Pacific-based Strike Forces," p.
12.
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former Admiral of the Fleet, recently described Soviet
Naval Aviation (SNA) and its capabilities.
[Soviet Naval Aviation is] one of the main
striking forces of our contemporary Navy. It
is genuinely oceanic. It has been transformedinto an important means of warfare against the
enemy s surface ships, submarines, and
transports carrying troops or cargoes, either
at-sea or in-port. is
o
The Soviet Services and Branches of The Armed Forces
described the SNA's missions.
Missile carrying naval aircraft are capable of
launching powerful nuclear-missile strikes
against nighly manoeuverable formations of
surface combat ships and enemy convoys[author's emphasis] in distant regions of the
sea and ocean cmd also against his ports and
naval bases at stand-off ranges.! 6i
Even the Badger has the range to strike east of Japan,
or if based in Vietnam, to cover all of the South China
Sea.
For sea lane defense, the deployment of about 60
Soviet TD-22N Backfire bombers in the region may be
more serious than any other recent Soviet move. The
supersonic bombers, have the ability to interdict vital
sea lanes and attack the U.S. Seventh Fleet far at sea.
Although 40 of the Backfire bombers are believed to be
assigned to strategic missions, they could easily be
used against shipping in a conventional war. In any
event, the Backfires are much better suited for an
offensive role rather than homeland defense. With
inflight refueling, there is virtually no point in the
North Pacific which the bombers cannot reach. i 62 in
reaction to this deployment the Japanese Defense Agency
sounded a note of alarm:
160. As reported by Sankei Shimbun . Tokyo, 1 March
1985, p. 1.
161. Zemskov, V. F. , Services^and Branches .of the
Armed Forces . Moscow. Voyenizda^r, iSYb, as quoted by G.
Jacobs, Soviet Naval Aviation, ' p. 345.
162. O'Neil. William D. , "Backfire: Long Shadow on
the Sea-lanes," United States Naval Institute . No. 103,
March 1977, p. 34.
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With the deployment in the region of the
Backfire bombers, the Soviet Far Eastern forces
have now obtained a far superior capability to
conduct anti -ground and anti-ship operations
than before. It seems that Japan's air defense
and protection of the seaborne traffic around
Japan would be gravely affected, i 83
The submarine component of the Soviet Pacific Fleet
is only slightly less impressive. The Pacific Fleet
consistently has approximately 40% of the strategic
submarines and 55% of the general purpose submarines.
Of the 77 non-ballistic missile submarines, 25 are
guided missile submarines (SSG or SSGN), which means
they carry anti-ship cruise missiles, either submerged
or surface launched. The other 52 are torpedo
submarines (SS or SSN) with either an anti-surface or
anti-submarine role. In a war, the majority of these
submarines would be assigned missions other than sea
lane interdiction, such as anti-carrier warfare, ASW
patrols against U.S. ballistic missile submarines,
defense of Soviet ballistic missile submarine patrol
areas, and "bastion defense," that is defending the
home waters of the Soviet Union to provide a sanctuary
for naval operations. Even so, undoubtedly some would
be sent to interdict allied supply lines, and even ten
deployed in that manner would cause havoc.
Historically the Pacific Fleet's surface units were
of poorer quality than the other fleets, but this trend
changed significantly in the late 1970s. In 1985 three
major surface combatants were trainsferred to the
Pacific: the Frunze, the second of the Kirov class
cruisers, the Osmotritelny, a new Sovremenny class
destroyer, and the Spiridonov, a new Udaloy class.
Thus the Pacific now has two of the Navy's
three operational fixed-wing aircraft carriers,
one of the Navy's two largest amphibious
warfare ships, its own complement of Backfire
bombers (20;, and two of the Navy's three most
specialized intelligence collection ships as
well as one of two operational Kirov class
183. Defgnsg g£ Japan, 1992. p. 32
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cruisers, and one each of the Navy's most
modem destroyers. 1 84
In addition to these new units, the Pacific surface
force includes 82 major surface combatants and 419
other vessels.
While the Soviet surface fleet is powerful, it
would not play a significant role in sea lane
interdiction because of its lack of organic airpower,
which makes it highly susceptible to U.S. carrier-based
air attack and land-based air attack from Japan.
In addition Soviet surface units would be difficult
to sustain in the Pacific because its supply lines to
Vladivostok must pass through one of the three straits.
Compounding this difficulty is the fact that logistics
support is perhaps the weakest link of the Soviet
Pacific fleet. Outdated and insufficient transfer
equipment, inadequate numbers of modern high-speed
replenishment ships, and an overly burdensome
administration severely tax the Soviet fleet's ability
to operate underway for long periods. With the
exception of the Berezina, which is the only Soviet
replenishment ship comparable to U.S. supply ships,
Soviet supply ships are small and many have a maximum
speed of 16.5 knots, which is inadequate. These ships
can not provide sufficient support to maintain a battle
group at sea indefinitely.
The inadequacies of Soviet under>?ay replenishment
are illustrated by a recent incident: "During SUMMEREX-
85 Phase II, as the Kiev and its task group sailed from
the Baltic Sea to the Northern Fleet, one of the
Sovremenny class destroyers took 14 hours to refuel
164, Daniel, Donald C. and Tarleton, Gael Donelan.
"The Soviet Navy in 1985." Proceedings .Vol 112, No. 5,
ay 1986, p. 98. Various sources give different etimates of
tne number of Backfires, ranging from 20 to 80.
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astern of the Soviet merchant tanker Aluksnel"i6 5 it
typically takes U.S. destroyers an hour or less to
accomplish the task.
This weakness severely limits the Soviet Pacific
Fleet's surface combatants. The problems of slipping
out through the straits, keeping supplied, and the
danger from air attack all support the conclusion that
Soviet surface units will not have a sea lane
interdiction role. Although they might sortie to aid
air and sub-surface units in combined attacks on U.S.
carrier battlegroups, they will probably be held back
to defend the home waters of the Soviet Union and
provide "safe" operating areas for their own ballistic
missile submarines.
Finally, the Soviet Pacific Fleet's ability to
successfully project power against a first or second
rate power beyond the range of land-based Soviet
airpower is hampered by a lack of fixed wing aircraft
carriers, and insufficient numbers of amphibious
assault ships, and supply ships. Soviet Pacific naval
assets are summarized in Table IV.
In addition to having a powerful pacific fleet, the
Soviets appreciate the advantages of mine warfare.
During World War II, 52 percent of Soviet destroyer
losses were due to mines. 168 The Soviets remembered
the lesson. There are over 400,000 mines in the Soviet
and Warsaw Pact countries' combined inventories and the
Soviets have an extensive capability to lay them.i®7
In addition, "Moscow has an estimated 250-300
165. Van Tol, R. "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-85."
Naval Forces . Vol. VII, No. VI, 1986, p. 34.
186. Thomas, Gerry S.. "The Pacific Fleet," in The
Soviet Navy , eds . Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Watson,
Westview Press, 1986, p. 229.
167. Resing, David C. CDR, USN. "Mine
Countermeasures in Coastal Harbors." Naval War College
Review . Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring 1987, p7 63.
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TABLE IV: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET
STRATEGIC FORCES Pacific Fleet: 32 SSBMs*
Naval bases: Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk
Submarines: 77 SSGN 25 SSN/SS 52
Principal Surface Combatants: 82
ASW Carriers 2 ^^ Amphibious 59Cruisers ,15 Patrol 136
Destroyers 14 Mine 96
Frii?ates 21
Corvettes 30 Auxiliaries 128
Naval Infantry: 4 regts.
NAVAL AIR (Pacific Fleet Air Force) HQ Sovetskaya Gavan
Bombers: ^160: Anti-submarine Warfare: 175
,^ Backfire , 20 Fixed wing: 70(Bear, May, Mail)
Badger C/G 140 Helicopters: 105:
„. , Afloat: Hormone A 2 bns.Fighters/Attack: (afloat) Ashore: Helix 1
bns.
Forger A/B 30 Haze 2
bns.
Recon/EW/ECM: some 35 aircraft Utility: 65
aircraft
*Two operational Delta IV* s are in the Northern Fleet.
Source: The Military Balance 1986-87 . International
Institute for btrateglc studies, 1986. Table drawn from
information pp. 31-46.
minesweepers and is the world's leader in mine
warfare."! 6 s The Soviets also have an offensive
doctrine that calls for minelaying in key sea lanes.
Soviet literature reveals an increasing interest in
mine warfare. It claims that "post-World War II
experiences have validated the increasing importance of
the mine as a weapon. "is 9 And that mines are
particularly effective when used offensively on SLOCs,
Seen
169. Bray, Jeffrey K. , Gunner's Mate (Guns) First
Class, USN, "Mine Awareness," U.S. Naval Institute
^
Proceedings . Vol. 113, No. 4, Aprir 1987 , p 527
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in chokepolnts , and against ports. Considering Japan's
experience in World War II, this should be particularly
ominous
.
For these missions Soviets consider the submarine
to be the ideal platform for mining. I'^o It is covert,
thus can lay mines in areas where aircraft and surface
ships might be opposed, and can reconnoiter the
undersea terrain before laying the mines.
Unfortunately, submarines are vulnerable in shallow
water where minelaying is likely to carried out, and
are subject to detection in the process of actually
laying the mines. Another disadvantage of submarines
is their limited capacity. On average they can carry
from 12 to 18 mines.i^i in spite of this, the Soviets
have assigned a large minelaying role for their
extensive fleet of diesel submarines, as well as some
nuclear boats.
The other two minelaying platforms each have
advantages and disadvantages. Surface ships can
deliver larger quantities of mines and accurately plot
their location. Even merchants can be used for
minelaying without much modification. However during
minelaying, ships are vulnerable to attack. Ships are
best suited for laying defensive mine fields in
uncontested waters, such as the Sea of Okhutsk.
Aircraft can deliver mines quickly but can not
accurately plot the mines' position, making them the
best platform for "rapid response" or reseeding.
Aircraft can quickly block a chokepoint or harbor if
there is not heavy opposition. Another feature of
aerial minelaying, which may or may not be an advantage
depending on the circumstances, is that it tends to be
the most visible.
170. Bray, p. 43.
171. Navy International . "Mines and Mining," p. Ill
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The impact of offensive mining can be devastating.
It is a cheap way to sink ships and ties up many other
ships while sweeping is underway. These are the
features which the Soviets find attractive, because
mining provides the "maximum disruption with the
minimum of effort", especially when combined with small
numbers of submarines, ships or aircraft in widely
dispersed attacks.i7 2 a few mines placed in a harbor
or on a shipping lane can divert or halt a lot of
merchant shipping. An incident from World War II
illustrates this perfectly. A total of six mines were
dropped in Haiphong harbor in October 1943. Three of
them exploded sinking three ships. Then a convoy of
ten Japanese ships refused to enter the harbor until it
was swept. No minesweepers were available so the
harbor was closed for the remainder of the war.17 3
Mine warfare was not observed in the 1983-85 Soviet
exercises, probably because dropping practice mines in
international shipping lanes is a highly provocative
act. But it is likely to be a Soviet strategy because
offensive minelaying, conducted by submarines and
aircraft (and possibly simple mines in the opening
stages of the war, by merchants, fishing vessels, and
auxiliaries), is a relatively simple matter which does
not require much precision. Mines would be
particularly effective in the straits leading to the
Sea of Japan, the Straits of Malacca, in closing
Japanese euad Korean ports, and in closing U.S. bases at
Yokosuka and Subic Bay.
Defensive minelaying, laying mines to protect ones
own harbors and coastlines, also receives a high
priority with the Soviets. The same "chokepoints" that
172
. Van Tol, p. 29
173. Greer, William L. , and Bartholomew, James, CDR,
USN, "The Psychology of Mine Warfare." USNI Proceedings.
Vol. 112, NO. 2, February 1986, p. 58.
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the U.S. Navy hopes to use to keep the Soviet Navy in
its home waters, can be used to keep the U.S. Navy out.
For example, the Soviets could lay defensive minefields
on the inside of the three straits leading into the Sea
of Japan to keep out American submarines. With the
world's largest stockpile of naval mines, "including
deep-water rising mines and underwater electric
potential mines for use against submarines under ice,
"
and the variety and number of delivery platforms to
match, the Soviets may be able to close the Bering
Strait.174 This would free other naval assets,
submarines for example, for offensive operations
against the enemy.
The Soviet Union has two allies in the Pacific,
North Korea and Vietnam, who could provide some
assistance in war. North Korea does not have much to
offer the Soviets militarily for sea lane interdiction.
The Navy has 520 ships, including 20 submarines, 2
frigates, and 32 high-speed missile boats. The surface
force is suited for coastal defense. The North Korean
submarine force includes four of the Soviet Whiskey
class, four Romeo class submarines transferred from
China, and 12 locally built Romeo class submarines.
The North Koreans are believed to have taken advantage
of the fact that the shallow waters surrounding Korea
are ideal for minelaying, and have designed or
converted their submarines accordingly. In addition,
ocean currents in the Sea of Japan would carry floating
mines launched from North Korea down the peninsula in
fifteen days or less, threatening Japanese and South
Korean shipping lanes. i^
5
174. Peterson, Charles C. "Strategic Lessons of the
Recent Soviet Naval Exercises." National Defense . Vol.
70, No. 415, February 1986, p. 34.
17 5. Park, J. K. , "North and South Korea: A
Comparative Naval Study," Naval Forces . No. 11, December
1985, p. 35.
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The North Koreans could aid the Soviets by allowing
bombers to cross their airspace, shortening the flight
to attack Japan's southern sea lanes. Allowing Soviet
vessels to use North Korean ports would alleviate
logistics problems, especially if the North Koreans
permitted supplies to be brought in by rail from
Vladivostok. This would be a great aid to the Soviet
Pacific fleet because North Korean ports, unlike Soviet
ports, are virtually free of ice year around.
Fortunately the North Koreans are very jealous of their
independence and likely to resist a permsuient Soviet
presence. Because, if the North Koreans were to give
the Soviets basing rights on the east coast, the
Soviets would be able to maintain a permanent presence
in the Yellow Sea and would have unrestricted access to
the Pacific.
Recent relations between the two countries have
been improving. Military cooperation between North
Korea and the Soviet Union has been closer since
President Kim's May 1984 visit to Moscow. The Soviet
Union has given North Korea Mig-23 fighters and SA-3
surface-to-air missiles. And in July 1986, three ships
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, including the aircraft
carrier Minsk, visited a North Korean port. The North
Koreans and the Soviets also held a combined naval
exercises in the Sea of Japan in October 1986.
Vietnam is another Soviet ally valuable for its
strategic ports. Vietnam's navy is a collection of
former U.S. and Soviet vessels, including four
frigates, two cojrvettes, some small missile boats, and
no submarines. Without the ability to operate far
offshore, the Vietnamese Navy is of little account.
But the 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation gave the Soviets access to naval facilities
at Cam Ranh Bay and an air base at Da Nang, enabling
123
them to maintain a permanent presence in the South
China Sea. The Soviet air base at Da Nans, an
electronic facility at Cam Ranh Bay, and the expansion
of ports at Kompong Som and At Ream in Kampuchea on the
Gulf of Thailand, put the Soviets in excellent position
to interdict Japan's southern sea lanes of
communication especially the important shipping lanes
through the Strait of Malacca.! 7 8 These bases threaten
U.S. control of the area, and are undoubtedly high
priority targets for the American Pacific forces in the
event of war.
The situation for Japan is not as bleak as it may
appear. In the Pacific the Soviet face the armed
forces of China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the
United States as potential opponents. In a war this
would be a serious situation. Soviet bases in East
Asia are isolated. They have the longest, most exposed
and vulnerable sea line of communication in the world.
It stretches 12,000 nautical miles from Soviet ports on
the Black Sea through six seas, two oceans, and six
canals and straits to the port of Vladivostok. (The
sea routes through the Arctic are only open part of the
year. ) To illustrate the importance of this SLOC, the
USSR is the largest single user of the Suez Canal.
Four times as much Soviet cargo is transferred annually
by sea as on the vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway (and
soon the Baikal-Amur Mainline), which has to support
all of the Soviet Far East. In addition, the major
base at Petropavlovsk, which has no rail or road
communication with the mainland and must be completely
supplied by sea, is a 1500 mile sea voyage beyond the
rail terminals at Vladivostok.! 77
176. Defense of Japan. 1984 . p. 27.
177. Defense Nuclear Agency Report 5298F, Targeting
Soviet Naval Pro.iection Forces, by D. A. Paolucci and
others, ^b April 1980 TpT 957
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The Soviet Union has tried to protect its
vulnerable southern SLOC by forward deploying naval
squadrons to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
But the Soviet Pacific Fleet does not have the assets
to fight a major war in East Asia and the Indian Ocean
at the same time.i78 The Soviets must assume that the
United States will cut this SLOC. This would create a
colossal logistics problem for the Soviets, and
probably severely limit naval operations in the
Pacific.
Fortunately for the Japamese sea lanes, the Soviet
Union is unlikely to commit many of its units to an
interdiction campaign. Soviet military doctrine
stresses the importance of combined operations and the
Navy's role in supporting lauad campaigns. The role of
sea lane interdiction in war is acknowledged, but
Soviet doctrine states that though a war can be lost on
the sea, it can only be won on the ground. For this
reason the Soviets Naval assets are likely to be
assigned defense of the home waters, or the "bastions",
as a primary mission, with SLOC interdiction as a
secondary mission. i''
9
Exercises seem to confirm this. In the past, such
as Okean-70 and Okean-75, exercises were directed from
the Main Naval Staff in Moscow. Air attacks in the
Atlantic and Pacific were coordinated and nearly
simultaneous. This reflected the prevailing attitude
of the vital importance of the 'Battle of the First
Salvo' which stipulated that the most massive strike
possible was to be delivered at the start of the war.
There was no need for flagships or local control since
178. Westwood, James T. "What Will Its Meticulous
Planning Lead to Tomorrow?" The Almanac of Seapower 1986 .
Navy League of the U.S., 1986. P. 337
179. Fisher, Richard, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction," Ihfi
Soviet Navy , eds. Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Watson,
WestviewPress, 1986, p. 162.
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it was assumed that the war would quickly escalate to
the nuclear level. This view has given way to the
belief that war with the West would probably start with
an extended conventional phase, and might terminate
below the nuclear level, stimulating interest in sea
lane interdiction.i^o This change has resulted in
numerous command reorganizations, changes in tactics,
and an emphasis in ship design on sustained operations
rather than maximizing the first strike capability, i *i
In contrast to the world-wide co-ordination of
Okean-75, FALLEX-83 was much more diffuse and was not
run according to a single master plan. In Okean-75,
the shooting section of the exercise lasted three days,
with nuclear escalation on the third day. In SUMMEREX-
85 Phase III, the shooting period lasted seven days
with no nuclear escalation. In Okean-75, naval forces
deployed in positions to deliver a pre-emptive strike.
In recent exercises tactical problems have been
emphasized, such as anti-surface ship (especially anti-
carrier) tactics by aircraft and submarines, anti-air
and anti-submarine defence by surface ships, and long
range sorties aimed at isolating South Korea and Japan
from reinforcement.
The recent exercises seem to indicate that, for the
most part, Soviet strategy continues to be one of sea
denial, that is, being able to deny use of the sea to
an opponent. Sea control, on the other hand, implies
the ability to control an area to accomplish a mission,
such as convoying, amphibious assaults, and air or
missile attacks against the shore.
Large ocean exercises have been the exception
rather than the rule in the Pacific. Nonetheless there
180. Fisher, p. 162.
181. The following information on Soviet exercises is
from R. Van Tol, pp. 20-24, opinion previous cited, unless
otherwise noted.
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were two in 1985, and these provide clues to the Soviet
strategy in the Pacific. On examining these exercises,
we need to keep in mind that "in the Soviet Navy it is
the air, and especially the submarine forces which are
the primary combat arms, the surface forces being
supportive to their missions. "is
2
In April, during SUMMEREX-85 Phase I, a battle
group comprised of the Kiev class carrier Novorossiysk
and eight other ships made an extraordinarily long
transit into the Pacific—steaming out 1500 miles east
of Tokyo—before turning around and returning toward
the Kurile Islands and Sea of Okhotsk. The force was
kept under surveillance by Soviet aircraft and
attacked, probably by coordinated air and submarine
forces, 600 miles east of Japan. 20 Backfire bombers
took part in the attack. The attacks clearly showed
the SNA's determination to mass its aircraft for
continuous attacks ("wave" attack doctrine) against a
hostile threat. 183 Analysts concluded that the
Novorossiysk group was simulating an American carrier
battle group intent on attacking Soviet ballistic
submarine support facilities.i 8*
The Novorossiysk's tactics illustrated the
difficulties the Soviets have with replenishment ships.
The group had to take two replenishment ships with it
because Japan sits astride the line of supply back to
Vladivostok. The Altay class tanker's maximum speed
was 14 knots, curtailing the group's operations. To
ease the situation, the tanker was sent alone on a
short-cut through the Tsugaru Straits between Hokkaido
and Honshu, while the group went south around Okinawa
182
.
Van Tol, p. 22.
183. Jacobs, "Soviet Pacific-based Strike Forces,
p. 21.
184. Daniel and Tarleton, p. 105.
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before meeting up with the tanker north of Iwo Jima.
This maneuver is not likely to work in wartime. Even
so, the group was still constrained to 19 knots, the
maximum speed of the Boris Chilikin, the other
replenishment ship. Only when the group returned to
port, and the auxiliaries were left behind, was the
group freed from this speed constraint.
Vessels deployed to the Indian Ocean are probably
expected to be destroyed before they need logistics
support. But the Soviet Pacific Fleet will be
constrained to operate only in the Sea of Japan and the
Sea of Okhotsk until it gets better logistic support.
The deficiency of the auxiliaries is offset somewhat by
the Soviet Merchant Marine, most of which are equipped
for astern refueling of naval vessels.
The Pacific was the scene of another large naval
exercise in September 1986. This time the Novorossiysk
and 20 other ships and submarines, as well as Backfire
bombers, MiG-23 Flogger fighters, and ASW patrol
aircraft, defended the Kurile Islands area and the Sea
of Okhotsk. This tactic fits the Soviet "bastion"
concept of deploying their nuclear ballistic submarines
(SSBNs) in constricted waters near the USSR, where they
can be defended by a combined-arms, multiservice
effort. Most Western analysts agree that the
execution, or the deterrence, of nuclear war has
priority over the Soviet fleet's other missions.! * 5
In the Pacific two bastions may be established.
The narrow entrances to the Sea of Japan at the
Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse Straits may be sealed
by Soviet forward defensive barriers, providing a
sanctuary for Soviet naval operations. The Sea of
Okhotsk is protected by the Kurile island chain, and
185. Tritten, James J. "Defensive Strategy and
Bastion. ' Sea Power . Vol. 29, No. 12, November,Offensive
1986, p. 66
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could also be sealed, but it is partially iced over
much of the year. On the other hand, Petropavlovsk,
located on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is directly on the
Pacific Ocean, free from natural barriers, making it an
ideal base for submarines.
The Soviet Navy's concern for seizing control of
the Soya strait in order to ensure access to the
Pacific from the Sea of Japan, may have been the reason
for landing exercises on the southern coast of Sakhalin
on 28 August 1987. While Soviet aircraft conducted
large-scale bombing missions, 25 naval vessels
assembled in the Sea of Okhotsk. The landing was
conducted and then 14 ships, including the aircraft
carrier Novorossiysk and the amphibious assault landing
ship Ivan Rogov, departed through the Soya Strait late
on the 28th and early on the 29th of August. 186
Analysts believe the exercise may have simulated an
invasion of the northern tip of Hokkaido to capture
both sides of the strait for the Soviets. The exercise
demonstrated the value of maritime air patrol because
the Soviet ships were initially spotted and tracked by
MSDF P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes. i«7
In summary, the predominance of low grade surface
combatants in the Soviet Pacific Fleet reflects its
missions: The surface force exists primarily to protect
the strategic SSBNs and as a coastal defense to protect
the Soviet homeland against attack by enemy naval
vessels. The missions of SLOG interdiction, sea
control amd sea denial are secondary missions for it.
The surface fleet is not equipped to fight in waters
far from the Soviet Union. "The major weakness appears
in the forces that are performing extended, independent
188. The Britj-sh Broadpasting Cooper^tiyn , "Japan
Reports Soviet Landing Exercises on Sakhalin, " 31 August 1987
187. Kvodo News Service , "MSDF Maintains Close Watch
On Soviet Naval Movements, " Za August 1987.
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surface combatant operations outside the umbrella of
land-based naval aviation. "i 8^ Power projection is a
secondary mission of the Soviet Navy and the ability to
project power in a manner comparable to the United
States Navy remains in the distant future.
But the considerable sea denial capability inherent
in the Pacific Soviet Naval Aviation force, cuid the
Pacific submarine force reflect a completely different
strategy. Against Japan, a relatively small Soviet
effort in minelaying, and anti-shipping submarine and
air patrols, would reap great benefits in sea lane
disruption. Such a "low cost—large benefits" strategy
is widely promoted in Soviet military literature and in
the event of war is likely to be employed against
Japan.
A consideration of the possible scenarios reveals a
sea lane interdiction campaign against Japan to be the
most likely threat. The Soviet Union has no motivation
to launch a massive invasion of Japan, which would
require enormous resources and cost many casualties.
However, a sea lane interdiction campaign against Japan
would cost very little and would have a greater effect
than invasion. Japan is not self-sufficient in food,
energy, or resources and would quickly feel the effects
of a blockade.
If the Soviet Union were to launch a massive sea
interdiction campaign against Japan, the United States
would be forced to intervene to protect its most
important Pacific ally, possibly beginning a global
war. The Soviet leaders know this and would probably
avoid it.
The Soviet Union could use a limited sea lane
interdiction campaign against Japan, to gain a
188. Watson. Bruce W. and Susan M. Watson. The Soviet
Navy Strengths and Liabilities . Boulder: Westview Press,
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political concession, such as the termination of U.S.
basing rights in Japan, or an agreement to guarantee
free passage for warships through the Soya strait, or
perhaps to force Japan to agree to demilitarize
Hokkaido. Without U.S. aid, Japan would not be able to
resist. But the United States would probably
vigorously encourage the Japanese to resist and would
promise military assistance.
But the most likely scenario would be that the
Soviet Union is already fighting with the United States
and seeks to pressure Japan to stay out of the war, or
to deny the American forces the use of Japanese bases,
or to force Japan to grant concessions over Hokkaido
and the Soya strait.
In a war with the United States, the Soviet Pacific
Fleet's two primary missions are to protect the SSBN's
in the bastions and to destroy the U.S. aircraft
carriers. The majority of Soviet assets would be
assigned these two missions. However, a number of
aircraft and submarines would be assigned attack
American shipping, and if Japan was in the war, to
interdict Japanese sea lanes, put pressure on Japan,
and to divert allied assets into sea lane defense
operations. In this situation, Japan would desperately
need to be able to defend her sea lanes.
C. CHALLENGES AND IMPERATIVES
Japan's challenge is to respond to the threat to
its sea lames. The danger comes from the Soviet
Pacific Fleet's long-range aircraft and submarines,
either in the form of direct attacks against merchant
shipping or by a mining campaign. To defend against
direct air attack requires comprehensive air defense
over Japan's southern sea lanes. To defeat a submarine
interdiction campaign requires convoying, strait
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defense and barrier anti-submarine warfare. Mining
must be combatted by opposing the minelaying operations
and by sweeping.
The Atlantic Council study. Securing the Seas ,
estimates that 10 to 30 submarines and 30 to 60 long-
range aircraft might be assigned the mission of sea
lane interdiction in the Pacific. 1^9 These are
appropriate estimates, so for the purposes of this
research it is assumed that 20 submarines and 45
aircraft are assigned to attack Japan's sea lanes.
Convoying will be used to defeat the submarine and air
threat
.
In 1985 Japan imported 593 million tons of
resources, of which 29 percent was oil, 21 percent was
iron ore, and 16 percent was coal. Assuming that Japan
stockpiles 60 days supply of strategic resources, which
is the official government target, in a crisis the
government would institute rationing which would make
those supplies last for 90 days at wartime consumption,
as long as some imports were still arriving. In 90
days, according to the Securing the Seas estimates, the
loss of merchant shipping should begin to slow due to
submarine attrition from anti-submarine warfare.
Attrition of Soviet attack aircraft should begin to
reduce merchant shipping losses from air attack also.
Today's ships are larger and faster than those of World
War II. For this study 20,000 tons and 15 knots are
considered the average. One convoy of 60 ships
arriving every other day would deliver cargo at the
annual rate of 219 million tons or about 36.5 percent
of the peacetime deliveries. Vice Admiral Hozumi, and
other experts, consider 200 million tons annually to be
189. Nitze, Securing the Seas , p. 114
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the least amount of imports that Japan requires. 190
This is considered sufficient, with the 60 day
stockpiles, to keep the economy operating for a period
of perhaps six months allowing for some heavy losses
early in the conflict. i9i
All shipping going to Japan would be convoyed by
MSDF escorts. Shipping which would normally go through
the Malacca Strait will be rerouted south through the
Torres strait, or around Australia to keep shipping as
far from the threat as possible. This route adds a lot
of time to transits, but complicates the sea lane
interdiction campaign and would save some merchant
vessels. It would be better to get the cargoes later,
rather than not at all. Ships coming from Indonesia
and the Philippines would be routed south of the
Philippines (beyond the range of Backfire bombers) and
over to Guam also. The convoys would form up around
Guam where they would be protected by U.S. fighters.
Guam is approximately 2,000 nm from Vladivostok, (and
further from Sovetskaya Gavan) which is almost the
limit of the combat range of the Backfire bomber. Guam
is approximately 1,500 nm from Yokohama, which is
further than the Japanese government has agreed to
protect its sea lanes, but in a crisis the Japanese
might be willing to go further, or the U.S. could
escort them the first part of the way, or the convoy
could simply start without escorts and pick them up at
1,000 nm. This studies assumes that due to scarcity of
190. O'Connor. Michael, "Western Pacific Sealanes




Vice Admiral Hozumi of the JMSDF stated at the
fourth conference on the Security of the Sea Lanes held at
Taipei 13-15 July 1986, that he considered at least 200
million tons annually necessary to maintain the lowest
possible standard of living and self defence capability, as
reported in Michael O'Connor's "Western Pacific Sealanes
Under Growing Threat," Asian Defence Journal . January 1987,
p. 59.
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assets and the low threat at the extreme range of
attacking aircraft that the convoys begin the run
unescorted and are picked up 1000 nm from Japan by MSDF
escorts
.
The run from Guaun to Yokohcima would take just over
5 days if the convoys steam at 15 knots, considering
that they will only advance at 12 knots due to zig-
zaging and random course changes. They will steam
unescorted the first day, so the escorts will be making
the trip in four days, and allowing half a day to
refuel on each leg, the escorts will be able to make a
round trip every ten days. The average World War II
convoy had from six to eight escorts, but the number of
escorts did not appear to significantly affect the loss
rates of merchant ships, so these convoys will sail
with only six escorts. i 92
To deliver one escorted convoy every other day
would require a force of 36 dedicated escorts. The
plan calls for operating 6 escort groups (three going
in and three coming out) of six ships. Ideally an
extra 10 percent (four ships), to cover escorts sunk or
forced to turn back for emergency repairs, should be
allowed, but will be ignored. Allowing 30 destroyers
or frigates for coastal defense of Japan (the same size
force as is presently allowed) this convoying plan
would require a fleet of 66 escort ships. (With the
safety margin it would be 70.)19 3 Each of these
convoys would also be supported by one maritime patrol
aircraft, P-3C, twenty-four hours a day. Each squadron
has 10 aircraft. If we assume two are not mission
capable, and the other four fly 12 hour missions, (two
192. Nitze, p. 346.
193, Obviously the number of convoys, escorts,
distance, and speed all affect the number of escorts
required. 66 was decided on because the 6 additional
destroyers required would equal a large increase in
capability and does not appear to be an unreasonable goal
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hours out, eight on station, and two hours back), and
have 20 hours recuperation for the crew before the next
mission, then each squadron could support two convoys.
If the present inventory of maritime patrol aircraft is
providing efficient coverage of the waters around
Japan, then this plan would require an additional 20 P-
3C Orions for direct support of convoys. Another two
squadrons are required to provide minimum coverage for
barrier operations along the island chains, bringing
the total recommended increase to 40 P-3C's.
In addition, mine barriers would have to be laid in
all the straits leading into the Sea of Japan, and in
all the gaps in the island chains referred to above in
Sekino's plan. The number of mines depends on the type
of mine available and the depth of water, type of
bottom and intended target, which this study will not
specifically address.
Against the threat of long-range Soviet aircraft,
land-based fighters stationed on Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and
Japan, supported by early warning radar sites, AWACS
aircraft, and tanker aircraft make the most sense for
air defense. They are more cost effective, and much
less controversial in Japan, then building expensive
aircraft carriers. Since the MSDF intends to operate
primarily within land-based fighter range of their own
territory anyway, this would not be a significant
degradation of its capabilities. Concerning the MSDF's
proposed area anti-air (AAW) surface ships, even the
U.S. Aegis equipped Ticonderoga class would probably
not be able to provide enough air defense for a 60 ship
convoy that would cover approximately 60 square miles
of ocean (if ships were spaced a mile apart, which
might be too close) and maybe more. This is especially
true if the bombers all attack at the same time.
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The attacking aircraft have four alternative routes
to get to the southern sea lanes. They could fly west
over Sakhalin, turn south over the Kuriles, and fly
down the east side of Japan. In this case, they would
most probably be detected by radar sites on Hokkaido,
and could be intercepted by fighters based on Honshu.
Or they could fly over Japan itself, in which case they
would be detected and attacked by interceptors based in
Japan. They could fly over the Sea of Japan, down the
Tsushima strait and out into the Pacific. These
fighters should be detected by radar sites in Japan and
could be intercepted by fighters from Japan or from
Okinawa. The fourth route is over North Korea, if they
received permission, and is almost the same route as
the one over the Sea of Japan. The route that the
attackers would be the most likely to escape detection
on is the first one over the Pacific east of Japan.
But it is also the longest and could be defended by an
interceptor squadron on Two Jima.
The key to defeating the air threat to the sea
lanes, is in early detection. The JDA is investigating
a recent proposal to build two over-the-horizon-back
scatter (OTH-B) radars: one on Two Jima, and the other
on Kikai Jima, an Amami island just south of Kyushu.
These radars would provide early warning out to about
4000 km depending on atmospheric conditions, and cover
the airfields at Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan.
JASDF's F-15J Eagle fighters backed by airborne tankers
would provide the outer air defense of Japan and the
sea lanes . The second layer of early warning would be
provided by eight Grumman E-2C Hawkeye AWACS, which are
now primarily based at Misawa Air Base. The ASDF has
five more E-2C's included in the current mid-term
defense buildup program. But the E-2C is somewhat
limited in range and can not adequately cover the sea
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lanes out to 1000 miles. The ASDF also plans to
request tankers in the next defense budget, beginning
in fiscal year 1988. The final layer of air defense is
projected to be an Aegis-type destroyer. The JMSDF
plans to request the first in the fiscal year 1988, and
the second in 1990. Ultimately, it hopes to purchase
two more, which will give it one for each escort
flotilla. 19^ Unfortunately, in the meantime, with no
tanker support for the interceptors, there is little
air defense for the sea lanes.
To correct this, airborne tankers are needed. Then
the land-based F-15's could provide protection.
Airborne tankers and additional F-15 squadrons seem to
be a better use of the money. For this convoy defense
plsm, three squadrons of F-15 fighters operating in
support of the sea lanes, with one squadron supported
by tanker aircraft and an AWACS squadron from each
base, one on Iwo Jima, one on Okinawa and one on
Kyushu, should provide the minimum attrition rate to
destroy the force of attacking bombers before they can
destroy enough merchant ships.
The 45 bombers would probably attack the convoy at
the midway point of its transit, since it would be
furthest from air cover. If they flew one sortie a
day, they could attack each convoy once, hitting
perhaps 20 ships. Not all of these ships would be
lost, for as can be seen from the Persian Gulf War,
large merchants are difficult to sink with air launched
missiles. However, the number of hits and losses are
not as important as the attrition rate on the attacking
aircraft. As the force is diminished, unless the
losses are replaced by diverting aircraft from other
missions or by new production, it is obvious that the
19*. Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese
Style," USNI Proceedings . Vol. 113, No. 3, March 1987, p
98-101.
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merchant vessels lost to the air attack will decrease
daily. To illustrate this, imagine that 45 attacking
aircraft were able to destroy 20 ships, but lost one
aircraft to air defense. At the end of 45 days, all
the attacking aircraft would be destroyed and would
have destroyed 450 merchant ships. If no new aircraft
were assigned to the mission, the rest of the merchant
vessels would arrive safely.
Another aspect to consider in an air interdiction
Ccunpaign is that port facilities might be more
important than ships. The newer larger merchant ship
need larger berths to unload their cargoes and most
Japanese ports, such as Tokyo Bay, Osaka, cuid Kobe are
vulnerable to air attack. No missile sites defend
them, so they are dependent on the JASDF fighters for
protection. By destroying the ports, the attacker
could block the receipt of needed imports. 195
The submarine attack on the sea lanes would be
defeated by the war of attrition in the scuae way as the
air defense destroyed the attacking bombers. During
World War II, the average submarine sank 4.7 merchants
before being sunk. 196 if we double that ratio to allow
for the advances in a modern submarines equipment,
(probably an exaggeration) and allow the 20 opposing
submarines to sink 9 merchants apiece before being
sunk, they would sink a total of 180 ships. Securing
the Seas . found that the submarine threat was usually
defeated in 90 days, depending on the number and
effectiveness of the ASW forces opposing them. Adding
the 180 merchants that the submarines destroy, to the
450 merchants the aircraft destroy, gives the estimate
that, in this scenario, 630 merchants would be lost in
195. O'Connell, John F. , "The Role of the Self-
Defense Forces in Japan's Sea Lane Defense." Journal of
Northeast Asian Studies . Vol. 3, No. 3, Fail 1984, p. bO
196. Nitze, p. 358.
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the first 90 days of the war, with the majority being
lost in the first month, and then the losses would
decline. Thus of the 2700 merchants convoyed in the
first 90 days, 630, or 23 percent, would be lost, with
the about half of these losses occurring in the first
month. After that point, most of the merchants would
arrive safely.
The submarines would be destroyed as they passed
through the three straits, by barrier operations, and
mostly by the convoy escorts, including the supporting
P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Mining the straits,
defending them with the JMSDF submarines, and
patrolling them with the escorts assigned to the
district forces has already been mentioned. In
addition, the two island chains on each side of the sea
lane should be used to form an ASW barrier by
constructing sonar listening stations on the islands.
ASW helicopters could also be operated off these
islands. And at least one squadron of P-3C maritime
patrol aircraft should patrol each barrier. This
barrier should be strengthened by mining the gaps
between the islands, preferrable with the U.S. captor
mine. No forces would be deployed in area ASW. ASW
forces would encounter more submarines as convoy
escorts
.
Strait defense would probably be the second largest
method of destroying submarines. The principle means
of defending the straits should be mining. For the
reasons already discussed, mining is the most effective
of naval warfare. For this a stockpile of various
types of mines needs to be developed. But the
principle weapon would be the Captor mine. 197 The
minefields in the straits should be backed up with
197 Secyirlng t^e Seas estimated the cost of a Captor
mine barrier with a kill probability of . 1 would cost $60
million per 100 miles of barrier, p. 364.
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JMSDF submarine patrols. With their reputation for
excellent ASW they should produce a relatively high
attrition rate. One squadron of from two to three
submarines should be assigned to the Tsugaru strait,
and two squadrons each to the Soya and Tsushima
straits. The remaining submarines could be assigned
against Petropavlovsk, or to barrier operations, or to
trouble spots on the sea lanes. The surface escorts
not assigned to convoy duty are divided into ten
regional squadrons. They should patrol each of the
straits, depending on whether they can be protected
from the air threat. Other squadrons should patrol the
coastal approaches to keep watch for submarines laying
mines and to lessen the chance of merchants sinking in
the port approaches. They should not be deployed in
the Sea of Japan, as there is little invasion threat
and they are too vulnerable to air attack. The
surface-to-surface missiles to be placed on Hokkaido
are the most effective defense against invasion, if
defensive minefields are laid and the missile sites are
defended against Soviet air attack.
The third option for employing the attackers is in
a minelaying campaign. Soviet submarines can carry an
average mine load of 15 mines. If all 20 submarines
were dedicated to minelaying operations, and were able
to make an average of ten patrols (which is an
attrition rate of 0.1) they would be able to deliver
3000 mines. Using the highest rate of effectiveness
from World War II mining, if one out five of those
mines were effective than 600 ships would be daunaged.
At the average World War II rate of effectiveness (1
out of 40) only 75 ships would be damaged. Since the
submarine could lay its mines with more precision in
the shipping lanes, it is reasonable to assume that
they would be more effective than the war averages. In
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addition, the mines that did not sink ships would still
have to be swept, tying up allied resources. Employing
submarines in a minelaying role rather than an anti-
shipping role would be more effective.
If the 45 aircraft were all dedicated to
minelaying, they could deliver an appreciably greater
number of mines than the submarines, especially because
they could fly more sorties since they would not have
as far to go. Backfires, Bear C/G's, and Badger A's,
all in the Pacific inventory, can carry mines although
their exact capacity is unknown. 19S (For comparison
purposes, A-6 can carry 5 2,000-lbs. mines, P-3's up to
11,000 lbs. of mines and B-52's can carry 44,000 lbs.
of mines. )199 The mines would be laid in the
approaches to Japan. The number of mines delivered
would be a function of the type aircraft and number of
sorties. But since the sea lane from Guam to Japan is
through water that is too deep to mine, aerial
minelaying would have to be done in waters close to
Japan, and thus within range of Japanese F-15
interceptors
.
Even so, recent experiences in mine clearing
operations (Haiphong, the Red Sea, etc. ) do not
encourage expectations that the 33 minesweepers of the
MSDF would be able to do more than keep a few essential
ports open. The MSDF minesweeping force is one of the
largest and best in the world, but a large-scale mining
csunpaign is beyond its abilities to overcome. 200
Long-range bombers from the bases in Vietnam could
mine the Straits of Malacca, however. This would cause
a faster rate of attrition. But even so, a mining
19S. Jacobs, G. , "Soviet Naval Aviation in the
Pacific," Navy International . Vol. 92, No. 6, June 1987,
p. 347.
199. Securing the Seas , p. 285.
200. O'Connell, p. 60.
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campaign would effectively destroy many merchant ships,
prevent others from reaching Japan, and engage a lot of
allied resources in opposing minelaying operations.
In summary, Soviet long-range bombers pose the
greatest threat to Japan's sea lanes, partly because
Japan has an inadequate defense against them.
Submarines also threaten the sea lanes, but only a few
would be used for SLOC interdiction, and the MSDF has
considerable ASW forces, this threat could be
successfully defeated with the addition of only a few
more ASW forces. A full-scale mining campaign would
also threaten to close Japan's sea lanes, despite her
capable minesweeping force.
This analysis has argued that Japan already has
most of the forces required to fulfill a mission of
defending its sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles.
Other analysts have proposed other force levels.
Sekino's plan and Shilling's plan have already been
discussed. Both of these plans stress protection
against the submarine threat and do not consider the
air threat. 201 The convoy plan presented in this paper
recommends increasing the SDF's forces by 40 land-based
maritime patrol aircraft, at least 6 and preferably 10
ASW destroyers, and two squadrons of interceptor
aircraft (40 planes), supported by two squadrons of
airborne tankers (8 or 10 aircraft). Another estimate
of the force levels needed by Japan for sea lane
defense out to 1000 nautical miles was made by Senator
Carl Levin and submitted to the U.S. Congress in 1983.
Senator Levin's estimate was reviewed by Norman Polmar,
a naval expert, who agreed with the recommendations
except that Polmar felt Senator Levin inflated the need
201
. Sekino's plan was not a convoy plan, but a sea
lane protection scheme. In a wargame about 1970, Sekino
estimated that 54 destroyers would be required to convoy 60
ships every three days from Guam to Japan. Auer, p. 165.
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for F-15's, AWACS, and SAM units slightly, and ignored
a critical need for sea-based aviation.202 Table V
compares these estimates to the NDPO which is still
Japan's intended force structure.
TABLE V: FORCE ESTIMATES FOR JAPAN'S SEA LANE DEFENSE
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16 15 27 15
2 flot 64 2 flot




Source: Figures compiled from plans as described in the
sources cited, exce^^ ^ "" ^'' ' ^'"^'^'^ --.-i--.- ^
Japan's Defense 198i
pt for the NDPO which are from
The earlier plans concentrate on defending against
submarines, because at the time they were devised, the
Soviet air threat was not as potent. Therefore they
emphasize fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and
surface ASW forces. This is true of the NDPO also. As
the guide for Japanese force levels it is obsolete.
The NDPO needs to be revised in accordance with the
current threat. The later plauns. Levin's and this
paper's convoy plan, pay much more attention to the
threat from Soviet long-range bombers. Both stress
using land-based fighters, supported by early warning
aircraft, radar sites, and tanker aircraft to defend
the sea lanes.
Control of the air and strong ASW forces also seem
to be the best defense against a massive minelaying
campaign since it is much easier to prevent mines from
being laid than to clear. However, Japan must maintain
202. Modly. Thomas B. , "The Rhetoric and Realities of
Japan's 1,000-Mile Sea-lane Defense Policy," Naval War
gollege Review . Vol. 38, No. 1, January-February lybb, p.
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a significant minesweeping capability to prevent a
limited minelaying campaign from closing its ports.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Japanese government has recognized the danger
to its sea lanes and the fact that the United States
can not protect those sea lanes alone. The
government's efforts, a strong economy, and an
awareness that the global balance of power is changing,
appear to have laid the foundation for a new consensus
on defense that would include a significant improvement
in Japan's abilities to protect its sea lanes out to
1000 nautical miles.
In achieving that capability, the best defense is a
plan that combines land-based air defense, convoy
operations, auid strait control and barrier operations.
Japan could achieve the capability to defend its sea
lanes within the next ten years with a moderate effort
to improve its existing forces.
Japan's efforts to protect its sea lanes would be
complementary to, and in conjunction with, U.S. efforts
to maintain control of the sea in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. The United States would continue to
provide power projection and offensive strike
capability in the Northwest Pacific. By guaranteeing
the safety of its own sea lanes out to 1000 nautical
miles, Japan would contribute greatly to the U.S. -Japan
alliance in a manner most compatible with its domestic
political principles and practices.
In Japan's efforts to reach a new consensus and
devise a new force structure for defense, it is
essential to pay close attention to ocean air defense,
convoying, and mining capabilities and ASW barrier
operations.
The air defense of Japan's sea lanes must be
improved by increasing the number of land-based
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interceptor aircraft. These additional aircraft should
be based on Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and southern Kyushu.
Airborne tankers need to be procured to give the
fighters the necessary range. Finally, the fighters
must be supported by early warning radar sites and
AWACS aircraft.
Past experience has shown convoying to be necessary
to defeat sea lane interdiction campaigns.
Technological advances have not changed this. The
Japanese government must consider convoy operations an
essential part of sea lane defense. Plans for
convoying should be promulgated prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. JMSDF commanders should be encouraged
to consider the tactical problems of convoying. 203
More surface escorts are needed to protect the convoys
that Japan would require if its sea lanes were
interdicted. Efforts to upgrade naval vessel's
defenses against anti-ship missiles should continue.
Japan's mine stockpile should be increased so that
sufficient mines are available to close the three
straits and to construct barriers to protect its sea
lanes. More delivery platforms are also required. To
aid in patrolling mine barriers protecting the sea
lanes additional maritime patrol aircraft are needed.
These ASW aircraft should be based on Okinawa, Iwo
Jima, and southern Kyushu, to give direct support to
convoys and barrier operations. Finally, the islands
along Japan's sea lanes should be improved with sonar
stations and helicopter landing strips to enhance
barrier operations.
20 3, Captain Stuart Landersman makes a convincing
case for recruiting retired naval officers into a reserve
program where they study the principles of convoying and
are encouraged to consider tactical solutions to convoying
before the outbreak of war in his article "I am a Convoy
Commander," USNI Proceedings . Vol. 112, No. 6, June 1986.
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These moderate increases in Japanese force levels
would greatly enhance their sea lane defense
capabilities and would be Japan's best contribution to
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